Military Intelligence

BATTLE FOCUS CENTER (IEW INTEGRATION) and BATTLE LABS

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DEPARTMENTS

STAFF

MILTON H. HAMILTON
Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army
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FEATURES

FROM THE EDITOR

As the new military editor of Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin (MIPB), I will briefly address the role and focus of the bulletin. The role of MIPB is to enhance professional development within the intelligence community and to help formulate doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures through an open and uninhibited dialogue. This dialogue will allow us to discuss and weigh tactics, techniques, and procedures that may deviate from doctrine, or may not yet be covered by doctrine! This does not mark a departure from previous editors and past issues of the bulletin. Our staff will continue to "build onto" the quality product they have been providing.

This is an exciting time within military intelligence We are on the "edge of great change" to our doctrine, training, leadership, organization, materiel, and soldiers. In order for MIPB to fulfill its role, we must tap into the exciting changes that are occurring. MIPB must tackle the critical concepts of "seamless intelligence support to the warfighter"; "a mission-based intelligence paradigm", synchronizing intelligence collection, production, and dissemination; and emerging technologies and equipment. These concepts are embedded in our newly revised doctrinal cornerstone field manuals· **100-5, Operations; 34-1, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations; 34-2, Collection Management and Synchronization Planning; 34-5, Human Intelligence and Related Counterintelligence Operations; 34-7, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Support to Low Intensity Conflict Operations; 34-8, Combat Commander's Handbook on Intelligence; and 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield.**

The quality of MIPB directly reflects the input we receive from the intelligence community MIPB needs you to submit feature articles, to provide feedback with letters to the editor, and to participate in the MIPB book review program. We accept articles covering all facets of military intelligence. Articles should be 8 to 15 double-spaced pages. Please include graphics or photographs if at all possible, and a disk of your article on Word Perfect, Multimate Advantage II, or Multimate 4.0. Include a short biography, home address, and work and home phone numbers.

Topics of interest include Corps Military Intelligence Support Element (CMISE) operations; intelligence support to Operations Other Than War (such as Bosnia, Somalia, Haiti); using automation and communications to provide a seamless intelligence architecture; challenges within the collection management and synchronization process; tactically tailoring intelligence support; and future military missions and threats.

Thanks to all the authors of this issue's outstanding feature articles, especially to Lieutenant Colonel Brooks and Captain Fahey for their assistance with the Battle Labs/Battle Focus Center series and Lieutenant Colonel Rosello for his assistance with the El Salvador series.

Special thanks to Mrs. Annette Castro, the acting editor of MIPB since June 1992. Her attention to the content and quality of this publication has ensured the release of four outstanding issues of MIPB, in spite of the lack of a military editor Her service to this publication and the readers has been excellent. She has helped maintain the professional development role of MIPB within the intelligence community, and has my appreciation for a job well done.

LETTERS

To the Editor:

I am responding to a letter from MAJ Womack (April-June 93) that commented on the article, "The Los Angeles Riots and Tactical In- telligence" by LTC William V. Wenger and 1LT Fredric W. Young (Oct-Dec 92). It was gratifying to know that the article was read and to see a response from the active component, in light of the lack of emphasis on this subject within the intelligence community. MAJ Womack deserves credit that he not only read the article, but also that he felt the

VANTAGE POINT

by Major General John F. Stewart Jr.

"Optimize the integration of Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Capabilities into the Warfighting environment."

General Frederick M. Franks Jr.
June 21, 1993

With this statement, General Franks chartered a new way of doing business at the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca. The Battle Focus Center (Intelligence and Electronic Warfare [IEW] Integration) stood up in early July 1993 as an integral partner in a revolutionary process. Our mission: integrate IEW across all battlefield dynamics through the five TRADOC Battle Labs.

The Battle Lab Concept is described as, "A means to develop capabilities for a Force Projection Army that begins where the battle appears to be changing. This concept encourages experimentation via simulations and prototypes using real soldiers and real units to mold the Army into its new role of Force Projection."

Battle Labs

As the Army's architect of the future, TRADOC uses battle labs to help make the future a reality today. Each TRADOC Battle Lab is responsible for a battlefield dynamic. The battle labs are—

☐ Mounted/Dismounted Battle Space—Fort Knox and Fort Benning.
☐ Depth and Simultaneous Attack—Fort Sill.
☐ Early Entry, Lethality and Survivability—Fort Lee.
☐ Battle Command—Fort Gordon and Fort Leavenworth.
☐ Combat Service Support—Fort Lee.

The battle labs develop concepts while examining new technologies for their assigned battlefield dynamics. They are responsible not only for their own dynamics but also for horizontally integrating these solutions across other battlefield dynamics. This ensures a unity of effort between the battle labs, and provides full integration of all battlefield operating systems toward warfighting objectives.

Battle labs serve as focal points for examining the latest concepts of battlefield doctrine, training,

leadership, organization, materiel, and soldiers (DTLOMS). Battle labs—

☐ Develop and experiment with new concepts.
☐ Examine battlefield dynamics.
☐ Seek out new technological capabilities to improve Army warfighting capabilities in the near term.
☐ Set directions for long-term change in the Army.

Battle Focus Center (IEW Integration)

The Battle Focus Center (IEW Integration), as the name implies, is the U.S. Army Intelligence Center's mechanism to integrate IEW across all battlefield dynamics, through direct support to the TRADOC Battle Labs. Its name originates from a suggestion by the former Commanding General, III U.S. Corps, Lieutenant General Horace G. Taylor. He stated that the entire intelligence system must focus command and capabilities on the mission in a complex operational environment. We took this name, giving the Center the specific mission to focus on the battlefield through integrated and improved IEW capabilities. The specific intent is to—

☐ Enhance intelligence support to warfighting at joint through tactical levels in force projection.
☐ Synchronize intelligence through horizontal and vertical integration in planning and operations.
☐ Provide seamless military intelligence from top to bottom, and focus downwardly to the tactical level.
☐ Embed intelligence capabilities at the lowest tactical level.
☐ Provide common graphics of the battlefield by merging top down intelligence and bottom up "cavalry" reporting.

Future IEW Development

IEW development at the Battle Focus Center concept is based on the MI tenets in FM 100-5, **Operations**. The Battle Focus Center is the focal point for change in the way MI will operate in the future. The Center initiates integration of IEW into the battlefield

by Command Sergeant Major Robert T. Hall

I want to take this opportunity to cite the work of three post activities which are making a real difference in the quality of life in our community:

- ☐ The Community Advisory Board (CAB).
- ☐ The Better Opportunities for Single Soldiers (BOSS) Program.
- ☐ The Quality of Life (QOL) Working Group.

Each activity has a separate interest, but compositely, they pursue the same goal—the betterment of living on Fort Huachuca.

Their efforts have been quite remarkable; in fact, so much so that HQ, TRADOC chose the Fort Huachuca Area Action Plan as the prototype for all of its installations to emulate.

Most significant is the fact that even though the target population of these committees is the single soldier living in the barracks, the entire community is the beneficiary. These are some of their successes:

- ☐ Features like new furniture, maintenance supplies, cable service, private telephone service, bulk storage, and a weight room have been added to the barracks, as well as carpeting and paneling. Each barracks has a community park, complete with volleyball courts, horse shoe pits, outdoor racquetball courts, and picnic areas.
- ☐ AAFES and the commissary accommodate single soldiers' needs by shelving and packaging goods in small quantities or individual servings. The commissary will soon offer a complete bakery, and the PX is increasing the volume of video and audio equipment.
- ☐ Other facilities, such as the post office, gymnasium, and recreation center, are changing their operating hours in an effort to make these facilities more available and convenient for soldiers and their families. A new weight training facility should become a reality within the next eight months.
- ☐ Dining facilities now play music to create a more pleasant atmosphere. Daily meals are varied with several main course choices; a nutrition bar is also available.
- ☐ Child Development Services have adjusted their hours to take into account the needs of single parents. In addition, we have dedicated more resources to the job of helping children learn and grow.
- ☐ The library has been working to purchase new books and to provide volunteer helpers so that operating hours can be extended.
- ☐ In the coming weeks, there will be nightly and weekend shuttle bus service to provide soldiers and family members with transportation to post facilities.

This is being undertaken with the assistance of all our partnership units here on Fort Huachuca: the Information Systems Command, 11th Signal Battalion, Electronic Proving Ground, Information Systems Engineering Command, the Health Services Command, and the Joint Interoperability Test Center. The command sergeants major of these organizations have also been chartered as a committee to analyze the post's welfare efforts and to make suggestions on how to enhance or sustain the progress we have made.

These adaptations on post have greatly increased productivity in units, families, and the community. The military mission is easier to accomplish because soldiers are happy and give their total focus to what has to be done. Credit the CAB, the BOSS program, and the QOL working group for the expanded services.

The leadership of this command gives total precedence to soldier care. We are committed to sustaining and improving our soldiers' quality of life. We depend on our special interest groups to keep us apprised of the social pulse and "sense of belonging" needs of the community. The command will always listen intently to their suggestions and, when feasible, incorporate them into our lifestyle.

To leaders of units at other posts, I recommend that you use these programs to the fullest. You will see positive results. If the programs do not exist at your post, you should work toward activating them at the earliest opportunity.

I salute all of the hardworking members of these groups. You are making a huge difference in TRADOC and the U.S. Army.

Battle Focus Center
(IEW Integration)

by Lieutenant Colonel John R. Brooks and
Captain John M. Fahey

The U S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
(TRADOC) is changing the combat developments
process with its battle labs Intelligence is at the
forefront of this revolution with its Battle Focus Cen-
ter (Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Integration).

Battle Labs: A New Dynamic

The Battle Lab Program is the idea of General
Frederick M. Franks Jr, Commanding General of
TRADOC and Commander of VII Corps during
Operation Desert Storm After the war, General

Franks concluded that "current methods of deter-
mining requirements and setting priorities cannot
keep pace, will not allow us to meet the budget chal-
lenges, will not allow us to maintain the edge, in this
post-industrial era." To look to the future in the
development process, General Franks created battle
labs.

The battle labs are designed to create a new way
of doing business. They do this by cutting across the
Army's current combat-developments structure to
study specific initiatives or work solutions for
specific problems. (See Figure 1.) Solutions are
developed through the heavy use of simulations and
testing by soldiers early in the development process.

BATTLE FOCUS

DEPTH and
SIMULTANEOUS
ATTACK

EARLY
ENTRY

MOUNTED/DISMOUNTED
BATTLE SPACE

BATTLE
COMMAND

COMBAT SERVIC.
SUPPORT

Figure 1.

This speeds up the process and gets systems into the units where they are needed. There are five TRADOC battle labs—Mounted/Dismounted Battle Space; Depth and Simultaneous Attack (D&SA); Early Entry, Lethality, and Survivability (EELS); Battle Command; and Combat Service Support (CSS). Each of these focuses on one of the battlefield dynamics.

Military Intelligence is not a battlefield dynamic, but it is unique in its widespread application across battlefield dynamics It is making significant contributions to the battle lab effort. As its contribution to the battle labs, The U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca developed the Battle Focus Center for IEW Integration. The Battle Focus Center has formal partnership with three battle labs—Depth and Simultaneous Attack (D&SA); Early Entry, Lethality, and Survivability (EELS); and Battle Command—and fully supports the other battle labs, Battle Space and CSS. The vertical integration between battlefield dynamics is a unique aspect of the battle labs and is the primary reason battle lab methodology is so effective.

IEW Development

The Battle Focus Center will be the focal point of all IEW architectural development under the TRADOC Battle Lab effort. It will allow us to share ideas, information, and technology resulting in an increased ability to support warfighters. As the focal point for battle labs, we expect the center to be aware of all Army IEW systems development and to provide the horizontal IEW integration across all DTLOMS (doctrine, training, leadership, organization, materiel, and soldiers) and into each battle lab. Battle Focus Center efforts are based solidly on concept; specific guidance comes from **FM 100-5, Operations**. The principles (see Figure 2) of Force Projection (IEW) are—

☐ Commander Drives Intelligence
☐ Broadcast Intelligence.
☐ IEW Synchronization.
☐ Split-based Operations.
☐ Tactical Tailoring.

Organization

The Center was built around an existing organization inside the Directorate of Combat Developments. The Advanced Technology Division was chartered to look at new technologies to assess their contributions to IEW. The difference in today's organization is that the center looks not only at new technology but also at new ideas such as organization and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) The most important aspect of the Center is the synergism resulting from the horizontal integration with other battlefield operating systems.

The Battle Focus Center has a headquarters and three branches—Battle Core, Space Technology, and Battle Technology. It also receives support from

PRINCIPLES OF FORCE PROJECTION IEW

THE COMMANDER DRIVES INTELLIGENCE

INTEL SYNCHRONIZATION MELD WITH OPNS

BROADCAST DATA UP...QUICK

MI

SPLIT-BASED CONCEPT FOCUS DOWN

TACTICAL TAILORING FLEXIBLE

Figure 2.

the IEW Technology Assessment Center:

- ☐ The Battle Focus Center headquarters performs the usual command and control functions for the Battle Focus Center.
- ☐ The Battle Core is the hub of the Battle Focus Center. It receives the "good ideas" from the units in the field, battle labs, and academia. The core reviews all the ideas, determines where they fit into the MI Concept and Architecture, and then determines the best way to prototype them. The main effort is to work with other battle labs. After prototyping, they track the ideas as they are tested and integrated into systems and doctrine.
- ☐ The Space Technology Lab is the interface with all national warfighting systems. The lab prototypes all system interfaces between national systems and the warfighter.
- ☐ The Battle Technology Lab is the technical interface with all tactical warfighting systems. Its members prototype all system interfaces between tactical systems and the warfighter.
- ☐ The IEW Technology Assessment Center (IEW TAC) is a team of Army Communications-Engineering Command engineers and representatives from Intelligence and Security Command, Army Research Labs, Program Executive Office (PEO) CSS, PEO IEW, and U.S. Army Topographic Engineer Command. It is the Battle Focus Center's interface with materiel developers and industry. It works directly with industry to search for new technology with IEW applications and eases its delivery for testing and prototyping. IEW TAC is key to ensuring that the battle lab is kept on the leading edge of technology.

TRADOC established five primary battle labs. IEW is fully integrated into the labs with the lead on specific tasks. A description of these labs and the IEW leads follow:

U.S. Army TRADOC Battle Labs

Depth and Simultaneous Attack—Fort Sill:
- ☐ Reduce detect-to-deliver time lines focusing on precision and time.
- ☐ Enhance the ability of the shooter to "SEE DEEP."
- ☐ Get Battle Damage Assessment "On Time" for the Commander.

Mounted/Dismounted Battle Space—Fort Knox and Fort Benning:
- ☐ Digitally link Military Intelligence and Cavalry from the bottom up.
- ☐ Develop a common enemy and friendly picture for dissemination on the move.

Battle Command—Fort Leavenworth and Fort Gordon.
- ☐ Enhance the ability of the commander to drive intelligence.
- ☐ Broadcast relevant intelligence to decision makers in time to affect the situation.
- ☐ Synchronize intelligence to operations planning and execution.

Combat Service Support—Fort Lee:
- ☐ Enhance force and asset protection.
- ☐ Conduct Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield to support the supporter.

Early Entry, Lethality and Survivability—Fort Monroe:
- ☐ Prepare intelligence and establish baselines to support force projection.
- ☐ Conduct split-based intelligence operations to support force projection.
- ☐ Develop early and accurate Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield.
- ☐ Develop capabilities to receive en route intelligence updates.

The process described above will be integrated into the warfighter environment.

Battle Focus Center Process

The process is relatively simple. (See Figure 3.) Good ideas are brought into the center from the entire IEW community focused on warfighting to include another battle lab. These ideas are bounced off of DTLOMS and the TRADOC Battle Labs. If the idea makes the "good idea" cut, it is then prototyped, simulated, or test-bedded. The idea is also tested by soldiers at Fort Huachuca, at the combat training centers, or during unit exercises. Once the idea is demonstrated and integrated, it is then handed off to doctrine writers and/or program managers for doctrinal integration. The result is a more capable Army.

Advanced Warfighting Demonstrations — ODC II

One of the primary methods in which ideas are demonstrated is through participation in Advanced Warfighting Demonstrations (AWDs). The largest Battle Focus Center AWD this year is Operation Desert Capture II (ODC II) which coincides with NTC rotation 94-07. ODC II is under the umbrella of Operation Desert Hammer VI, AWD for Battlefield Synchronization (AWDBS). It will be conducted for the Army Chief of Staff by the U.S. Army Armor Center Mounted Warfighting Battle Space Lab. (See Figure 4.)

The intelligence objectives of the ODC II are to—
- ☐ Automate bottom up intelligence (CAV) with

top down intelligence (MI). Computerize the push-to-talk SALUTE Report The exercise will test common digitalized SPOT reports combined with theater and national graphics of enemy situation and focus on intelligence support at the tactical level.

□ Link Interactive Graphic Intelligence. This will result in fusion of intelligence from division to maneuver brigade Attempts will be made to push the fused intelligence down to battalion

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
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
task force level using digital means, and pulling digital information reports from the battalion sensors up to the maneuver brigade.

☐ Enhanced Intelligence Support to Targeting and BDA. We will focus on speeding precise intelligence to the shooter (Precision + Time = "Near" sensor-to-shooter).

The Battle Focus Center is working closely with other battle labs to demonstrate how to best develop the objectives. In addition to Battle Focus Center objectives, we assist the battle labs in developing and completing their AWD and related objectives.

Like most AWDs, ODC II will coincide with a preplanned exercise or Combat Training Center rotation. The other battle labs are planning specific initiatives that will be tested during the demonstration.

A number of units will be involved in the exercise. The primary maneuver element will be 3d Brigade/24th Infantry Division (ID) (M). The 3d Brigade will have three task forces: TF 2-18 Infantry, TF 1-70 Armor (194th Infantry Brigade), and TF 1-502 Infantry (101st Airborne Division). III Corps, XVIII Airborne Corps, and 24th ID (M) will send support elements to assist in intelligence collection and processing. Our sister services will provide intelligence sensors and processor systems and link them with Army communications and processors.

Battle Focus Center Future

The Battle Focus Center intends to concentrate on 8 to 12 initiatives at any given time. New issues will be addressed as priorities dictate or present initiatives are implemented.

In describing the Battle Lab Program, General Franks quotes British Historian Michael Howard: "When preparing for the next war, armies almost never get it totally right. But the real issue is not to get it totally wrong. What armies must attempt to do is get it nearly right before they again go into battle."

"What we need to do, inside TRADOC," says General Franks, "is to continue to experiment in order for us to get it nearly right." The TRADOC Battle Labs and the Battle Focus Center are now in the forefront of TRADOC's effort to do that experimenting for the future.

LTC John R. (Randy) Brooks is the Deputy Director, Battle Focus Center. He has served as an MP company commander, automation officer in ITAC and AIA, and as chief of national systems G2 ARCENT during Operation Desert Storm.

CPT John M. Fahey is the Battle Focus Center's executive officer. He has served as an infantry battalion S2, company commander, and Group S2 during Operation Desert Shield/Storm.

:tle Command Battle Lab-
Fort Gordon

1 Vincent J. Colwell

ə soldier makes notes at his observa-
on activity in the enemy positions. He
·lectronic note pad, not paper and pen-
ərd the data. Satisfied with the product,
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nsmitted to intelligence and operations
at the operations center. The informa-
matically parsed and collated, is dis-
the battle map. The operations officer
high payoff targets, highlights the area
n the screen, and passes the graphic
·he fire coordination element. Within
smart weapons are destroying the tar-

ɜ fiction? No. Science fact. This depiction
telecommunications breakthrough for the
all achievable now, and it is just the begin-
'hat technology is doing for U.S. Army
·unications and battle commanders.
experiencing an explosion in the amount
·chnology available to meet our com-
·ıs and information processing capability.

The rate of technological turnover is now under two
years. The sheer volume of new technology and the
range of new applications threaten to overwhelm our
ability to keep pace and to field modern, effective
systems. As a result, we face several challenges:

☐ What to get to the field?
☐ How to get current technology to the soldier
so it can be effectively utilized?
☐ How to ensure that the fielded products are in-
tegrated into our battlefield architecture?

We must do all of this without the final products
being technologically obsolete when they reach the
soldier. Battle labs are designed to address these is-
sues.

The Mission

The Battle Command Battle Laboratory at Fort
Gordon—a co-laboratory with Fort Leavenworth in
working battle command issues—is a dynamic and
exciting new contributor to communications ar-
chitecture development. At Fort Gordon, the battle
lab's mission is threefold:

☐ Evaluate emerging technology for integration
into the current communications architecture

to enhance capabilities in support of Power Projection.

☐ Attempt to selectively compress the acquisition cycle allowing important technology to be fielded as rapidly as possible.

☐ Integrate its efforts with the combat developments community to make sure that technological solutions "fit" into the overall communications architecture and fully support TRADOC DTLOMS.

To get the most out of diminishing resources, it is imperative that the battle lab mission be accomplished. The battle lab acts as a link between the formal research, development, and acquisition (RD&A) process and the rapidly progressing technology of industry. The RD&A process has proven its worth in the past by providing reliable, high quality products to the battlefield. It relies on the Concept Based Requirements System (CBRS). This is a time-intensive process because of the extensive analysis and development required

Today's technological developments emerge too quickly for the current RD&A process to evaluate, develop, and field systems that can take advantage of the technological benefits. By applying new and innovative ways of doing business, the battle lab is intended to fill the gap. The "Enterprise Strategy" offers a change that can correct the current situation.

The intent of the battle labs is not to usurp the existing acquisition system, but to complement it. We need the ability to identify, invest in, and capitalize on critical technologies that support near-term needs. Simultaneously, we must continue working the programmatic long-term solutions. Through its activities, the battle lab at Fort Gordon is not restricted to looking at hardware and software solutions alone. It must also look for TTP solutions to existing challenges.

The Successes

The Secure Tactical Data Network (STDN) Demonstration series (recently changed to the Joint Warrior Interoperability Demonstrations [JWID]) is one example of the outstanding success of the Fort Gordon Battle Lab. The STDN Demonstrations have become increasingly more complex, with wider participation, as they attempt to prove new concepts, test interfaces, and provide solutions to architecture interoperability challenges.

Agencies like the Army Space Program Office (ASPO) take advantage of the STDN Demonstration process environment. The activities of ASPO and the battle lab have been instrumental in testing the compatibility and capabilities of such systems as the Forward Area SID/TRAP (FAST) system. Their relation-ship has been one of continued cooperation to solve the challenges of secondary imagery dissemination and multi-level security.

The recently completed STDN 4 carried this cooperative effort even further. A proof-of-concept demonstration for a split-based concept of operations for the All-Source Analysis System (ASAS) was conducted. During the demonstration, a distributed local area network was established between sensitive compartmented information (SCI) enclaves at Fort Gordon and Fort Hood. Portable ASAS Workstation (PAWS) terminals at Fort Gordon were connected via a TSQ-190(V) Special Purpose Integrated Remote Intelligence Terminal (SPIRIT) to an SCI enclave at Fort Hood. The Fort Hood enclave maintained the data base for the distributed enclave.

The challenge we now face is to maintain the spirit of cooperation that exists.

CANEWARE®, a host-to-host network encryption device, was used to support the use of the Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE) Tactical Packet Network (TPN) providing a rudimentary multi-level security capability. The potential of the demonstration is exciting. It could allow a reduced in-theater presence without a reduction in the ability to complete the mission.

These examples are just the beginning. The battle lab, and the Signal Center in general, has never been more committed to meeting the needs of the user community. The Intelligence Center is reinforcing this by the careful placement of MI officers in battle labs Armywide. The challenge we now face is to maintain the spirit of cooperation that exists. The battle lab at Fort Gordon will continue to identify and evaluate emerging technologies, working with the other TRADOC Battle Labs to improve the communications architecture.

The Signal Center is helping move the Army into the 21st century and the Battle Command Battle Lab at Fort Gordon is one of the leaders.

CPT Colwell is currently assigned to the TRADOC System Manager for Satellite Communications and works closely with the Battle Command Battle Lab at Fort Gordon. Colwell is a SIGINT officer, an acquisition corps officer, and was a tactical signal officer. He has degrees from the University of Maryland, Golden Gate University, and Eastern Michigan University, and is a graduate of CGSOC. Other assignments include battalion S4, brigade S2, and MIOAC/OBC/OTC instructor.

Depth and Simultaneous Attack Battle Lab- Fort Sill

by Captain David Hiles

Operation Desert Storm was a successful projection of firepower throughout the battlefield, even though there were deficiencies in joint and combined arms operations in the conduct of the deep battle. One weakness was the inability to effectively engage highly mobile, low signature, and highly lethal targets. The distribution of targeting information was either kept at levels above tactical or operational commanders or was received too late to be of targeting value. The data was late because of the time required for analysis and the number of communication nodes needed to pass data to weapon systems.

Lessons learned from Operation Desert Storm identified the lack of structures or organization to conduct joint targeting, target deconfliction, and airspace management at corps and echelons above corps.

The tenets of **FM 100-5, Operations,** expand the battlefield in time and space. Deep operations, according to **FM 100-5,** involve attacking the enemy deep to defeat him by –

- ☐ Disrupting his command and control.
- ☐ Nullifying his firepower.
- ☐ Destroying his logistics.
- ☐ Breaking his morale.

To do this, we must use long-range intelligence acquisition and targeting assets to find enemy targets, to track the targets, and to conduct target damage assessment. We must attack close and deep simultaneously to delay, divert, destroy, and defeat the enemy.

The Mission

The TRADOC commander has given the Depth and Simultaneous Attack (D&SA) Battle Lab the responsibility for examining all issues concerning the deep and simultaneous attack. This responsibility implies complete horizontal integration between itself and the other four battle labs, and includes the development of the architecture for timely destruction of enemy –

- ☐ Air defense.
- ☐ Command and control centers.
- ☐ Logistic support areas.
- ☐ Massed and moving armor.
- ☐ Artillery, rocket, and missile launchers.
- ☐ Incoming tactical ballistic missiles.
- ☐ Reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance.
- ☐ Target acquisition assets.

The solution to these issues requires the integration of Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and allied resources. This team must act as a synergistic, synchronized, and lethal force package. The ultimate goal is to produce a precision strike capability using –

- ☐ Attack helicopters and tactical missiles.
- ☐ Air Force attack and surveillance aircraft.
- ☐ Army target location and surveillance radars.
- ☐ Air Force satellite and Army ground-based sensors.
- ☐ Theater and national sensor systems.

The thrust of combat operations in the future will be precision strikes and rapid response. Weapons, both in existence and under development, are increasingly more accurate and have increasingly greater ranges. Current sensor systems can see farther than we can shoot. Additionally, the battlefield is not as well defined, and is more lethal than ever before.

To meet tomorrow's battlefield challenges today, the D&SA Battle Lab provides direction, oversight, and horizontal integration for the total battlefield dynamics. Our focus is threefold·

- ☐ Leverage emerging technologies to increase the accuracy of attack systems.
- ☐ Develop the ability to detect enemy systems and formations at maximum depth.
- ☐ Link intelligence collection assets with attack systems in near-real time to optimize precision targeting.

The D&SA Battle Lab's function is to develop capabilities for a Force Projection Army. The battle lab facilitates experimentation through the use of simulation and prototypes. First, we must determine requirements concerning doctrine, training, leadership, organization, materiel, and soldier support (DTLOMS). Since current economic realities hinder most new equipment starts, battle lab materiel requirements are primarily in the use of new technologies. The battle lab further conserves resources by focusing on and agressively ensuring the horizontal integration of technology across the

11

force.

The D&SA Battle Lab attempts to merge new technologies with operational requirements through various means. This involves demonstrations, simulations, experiments, and something known as "tinkering." The idea is to look at a problem and, without the constraints of convention, come up with solutions. Battle lab personnel are not locked into normal Army test and evaluation procedures that are time and resource intensive. The D&SA Battle Lab piggybacks off existing tests and evaluations as much as possible. This saves both time and scarce R&D dollars.

A Partnership

Almost by definition, the D&SA Battle Lab is a close partner with the entire combat and materiel development community. Membership in this community includes other battle labs, Army Materiel Command, Army staff, PEO/PM staffs, academia, industry, HQ Tactical Radar Correlator, our allies, Louisiana Maneuvers Task Force, other services, DOD and national agencies, and HQ TRADOC staff. We network by various electronic means to aid the flow of information and technology.

The D&SA Battle Lab provides the forum for combat and materiel developers and warfighters to conduct assessments. These evaluations look at current capabilities and potential technologies or applications to support D&SA operations. It uses scheduled events and training exercises to leverage resources already committed to these efforts. We also identify the effects and impact of new ideas and technologies on DTLOMS.

The battle lab attempts to get new technology into the hands of users as soon as possible. The user then has the opportunity to evaluate the product before it goes into production. The result is that the final product meets the real needs of the user in the field. This process avoids costly product upgrades.

The battle lab benefits the Army in many ways. Our operations will benefit industry and materiel developers as well. By allowing up-front development and prototyping in the field, the Army will more accurately define requirements. The process also reduces developer risk. Soldiers in the field can test modernization alternatives. Potentially, battle lab tinkering will shorten the fielding process.

The D&SA Battle Lab conducted a science and technology review in January 1993. The supporting battle labs (Special Forces, Battle Focus Center [IEW], Air Defense Lab, and Aviation) worked with the D&SA Battle Lab in this effort. Together, we reviewed 121 technologies and validated 21 opera-

tional capabilities requirements. From this review, the battle labs identified gaps in technology that we must bridge to accomplish the operational capabilities and requirements.

The D&SA Battle Lab identified 21 operational capabilities requirements. Fulfilling these requirements forms the basis for D&SA operations in the future. These requirements fall into four categories:

Technologies and concepts. The battle lab will look at technologies and concepts that will permit near-real-time targeting. This group of requirements includes—

☐ Reducing sensor-to-shooter communication links.

☐ Improving sensor capability to identify and classify targets.

☐ Increasing connectivity between national, theater, and corps intelligence centers to enhance the targeting process.

☐ Increasing the number and type of dedicated target acquisition systems available to corps and theater commanders.

☐ Developing sensors that have an all-weather, day/night capability.

☐ Improving target damage assessment operations; developing systems that can detect passive targets.

Tactical and operational targets. The second group of requirements includes improving our ability to defeat tactical and operational targets. Specific requirements within this group include—

☐ Improving the ranges of attack systems out to 500 kilometers.

☐ Increasing ranges of systems engaged in counterfire operations against enemy tactical ballistic missile systems.

☐ Increasing mobility and deployability of attack systems.

☐ Increasing use and capability of smart and brilliant munitions and sub-munitions.

Battlefield synchronization. The third group of requirements involves battlefield synchronization. Elements of this group are—

☐ Developing the ability of corps and theater commanders to have total, uninterrupted communications and automated data linkages throughout the depth of the battlefield.

☐ Streamlining the planning and coordination operations using artificial intelligence systems.

☐ Developing deep operation and coordination cells.

☐ Improving airspace management and coordination.

☐ Improving communications interoperability of joint forces.

- [ ] Enhancing communications between corps and subordinate units with systems that are not dependent on line-of-sight.

Protecting the force. The final group of requirements deals with protecting the force. Included here are enhancements that—

- [ ] Improve the survivability of systems supporting deep operations.
- [ ] Reduce the potential of fratricide.
- [ ] Improve world mapping capabilities.

Demonstrations and Simulations

The D&SA Battle Lab conducted several demonstrations and simulations during FY 93. We conducted many of these operations over extended distances and with minimal troop involvement. A brief discussion of some operations follows.

In October 1992, the battle lab conducted an experiment to see whether the Q-37 Firefinder Radar and Patriot could detect and identify the launch of an Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS). The participants operated from various places in the U.S. A Ground Station Module in Melborne, FL, simulated the downlink of Joint STARS data and forwarded this data to a TACFIRE station at Fort Sill, OK.

An ATACMS missile was launched from White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico. Both the Firefinder Radar and the Patriot Air Defense Artillery System detected the launch. The Patriot System correctly identified the ATACMS launch as a tactical ballistic missile. Communication relays passed the launch data from the Q-37 to the TACFIRE facility at Fort Sill. A fire mission went to another ATACMS unit at White Sands which successfully engaged a simulated enemy missile launcher.

In December 1992, Operation Desert Capture was conducted at the NTC. The D&SA Battle Lab participated for a portion of this major exercise. Our experiments showed that we could reduce acquisition-to-shooter delays and integrate sensor information into the deep fires execution process.

In February 1993, a similar demonstration was conducted. During this test, we further reduced sensor-to-shooter delays and were able to identify some communication difficulties with Air Force assets. We also simulated the passing of data between the Firefinder Radar and the Patriot Air Defense Artillery System.

In June 1993, the D&SA Battle Lab was a player in Rapid Response II. This exercise was a demonstration of precision strike force capabilities involving Army Aviation, Special Operation Forces, Field Artillery, and various sensors. During this exercise, we validated the use of simulations in demonstrations.

Our major objectives were met in FY 93. We significantly reduced sensor-to-shooter delays through integrated and automated communications links. The battle lab also showed that linkages between acquisition systems and attack systems were possible and effective. However, we also found out that significant work remains concerning—

- [ ] System improvements in command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C^4I).
- [ ] Interoperability (especially at joint level).
- [ ] Ranges of Army attack systems.
- [ ] Development of tactics, techniques, and procedures for deep operations.

Focus for 1994

The D&SA Battle Lab developed its goals for FY 94 along with the supporting battle labs. Our main thrust for 1994 will be to focus on continuing to reduce sensor-to-shooter communication links. This effort consists of five critical component issues:

- [ ] We will fully implement the Analysis and Control Element (ACE). This entails the integration of the ACE into Army operations with existing sensor systems to support the targeting process, and with technology to enhance ACE internal operations. We will attempt to develop TTPs to fully integrate the ACE with Deep Operations and Coordination Cell (DOCC) operations.
- [ ] We will fully implement the DOCC concept. Our goal is to produce a streamlined capability to plan, coordinate, and execute deep precision attacks. We also want the ability to interface the DOCC with the ACE and with other service and joint automated information systems. Through the use of planned tests and demonstrations, we will also develop TTPs for DOCC operations.
- [ ] We will work with the Battle Command Battle Lab and the Combined Arms Center to further refine current and future Integrated Battlefield Targeting Architecture.
- [ ] We will implement force protection procedures that detect and engage critical enemy targets.
- [ ] We will investigate and expand the use of simulations to evaluate emerging and advanced technologies, operations, and concepts across the range of military operations.

The DOCC

A major effort of the D&SA Battle Lab for FY 94 will be to fully develop the DOCC. The DOCC concept envisions a fully automated targeting facility that enables the commander to plan and execute

deep operations. It ensures that the deep battle integrates with the close operations of subordinate units The primary mission of the DOCC is to reduce sensor-to-shooter linkages and coordinate deep fires and other deep attack means

The DOCC will have automated communication linkages (direct or indirect) with organic, theater, and national sensors, Army Aviation, Field Artillery, and Special Operations Forces Additionally, the DOCC will tie into the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps when appropriate

The DOCC will plan, coordinate, and execute all aspects of deep operations This includes —

☐ Fire support
☐ Army airspace, command, and control (A^2C^2).
☐ Army Aviation attack assets.
☐ Air Force and Navy attack assets
☐ Special Operations Forces

Additionally, the DOCC will recommend sensor taskings and request target damage assessment missions

A computerized decision aid tool within the DOCC will assist the commander in fighting the deep battle This tool will provide him with an enhanced situational awareness of the battlefield both from the friendly and enemy perspectives. When the commander receives intelligence on a potential target, he can immediately decide which of his assets can effectively engage the target When the commander gives the attack order, the DOCC will immediately request a mission for target damage assessment

Operation Crossbolt

The D&SA Battle Lab will participate in several exercises experiments, and demonstrations in FY 94. The main event is participation in a Joint Warfighting Demonstration (Army and Air Force) from November through April 1994 This exercise, known as Operational Concept Demonstration II or Operation Crossbolt, is a four-phase exercise that will validate the DOCC concept in deep targeting. We will have a chance to evaluate DOCC operations in a joint environment

Phase I is a simulation that took place in November at Kirtland AFB, NM, and the Joint Precision Strike Demonstration Integration and Evaluation Node at Fort Belvoir, VA The simulation exercise will center on a rehearsal of sensors, C^4I, and Army attack systems employed during Phase II.

Phase II took place at White Sands, NM, in December A major test for the Army is DOCC/ACE interoperability and the coordination of intelligence collection and attack operations This phase involves a demonstration of key sensor and C^4I systems. The

purpose is to—
☐ Detect the launch of theater missiles.
☐ Rapidly process targeting information from available sensors.
☐ Develop targeting data to support the simultaneous engagement of missile launchers and incoming missiles.

Phase III simulation will focus on theater missile defense and attack operations. This experiment will take place in February 1994. It will also refine the scenario and serve as a dress rehearsal for Phase IV.

Phase IV will be the finale of the exercise. This phase will coincide with NTC rotation 94-07 Spring 1994. The scope of this exercise will include both the defense and attack aspects of theater missile defense. The evaluation will include Joint Precision Strike Attacks and Joint Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD) operations.

Major Army objectives for the exercise include—
☐ Improving joint C^4I linkages against critical targets.
☐ Demonstrating the reduction of shooter-to-sensor time lines.
☐ Exercising joint air space management.
☐ Validating joint precision strike doctrine.

Our battle lab will serve as a practical platform to grapple with the complexities of a changing world.

Our expected outcome for OCD II is the validation of the DOCC concept. This includes the operation of the DOCC in a joint environment and the integration of the DOCC with ACE operations. The ACE/DOCC team will reduce sensor-to-shooter time lines by enhancing the ability to plan, coordinate, and execute precision strike operations. This validation will include manning and hardware requirements and TTPs for the operation of the DOCC.

As we move from a more predictable Cold War environment into what promises to be a more uncertain future, our battle lab will serve as a practical platform to grapple with the complexities of a changing world. We will do this by experimenting and assessing new ideas and technologies for use on the new battlefield.

Captain Hiles is the action officer at the Depth and Simultaneous Attack Battle Lab at Fort Sill. Other key assignments are S2, 2d Brigade; S2, 2/14th Infantry Battalion; commander, Alpha Company, 110th MI Battalion; and CM&D chief, G2. All of these were at the 10th Mountain Division.

IRAN: A Contender for Mideast Hegemony

> There are ills that cannot be cured except through burning. The corrupt in every society should be liquidated....The Qur'an teaches us to treat as brothers only those who are Muslims and believe in Allah. [It] teaches us to treat those who are not thus differently; teaches us to hit them, throw them in jail and kill them.[1]
>
> *Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini*

by Captain Benjamin D. Crockett

In the last two years the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) has clearly surpassed Iraq and the former Soviet Union to become the primary candidate for hegemony in the Persian Gulf, and possibly the entire Middle East.

Cold War/Gulf War Beneficiary

The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the defeat of Iraq by coalition forces have propelled the IRI to the status of a major power in the Middle East.

These two watershed events did more than mere-ly weaken Iran's chief competitors, the USSR and Iraq; they freed up most of the political and military assets Teheran had previously used to counter the threat of those two nations. Furthermore, the fragmented Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the wounded state of Iraq, rather than simply becoming spectator nations to Iran's policies, have become political and territorial targets of the Iranian Republic.

While Iran takes political gambles from Algeria to Kazakhstan, the main concerns of Syria, another regional contender, are still local ones — the Israeli threat and the situation in Lebanon.

The dissolution of the USSR at the end of 1991 released those Iranian military resources tied up in the defense of the IRI's northern borders. Given the former USSR's goals of acquiring warm-water ports and increased physical access to the Middle East, the Soviet threat to Iran was both viable and constant.

But the new state of Russia does not have the political objective to invade Iran. Russia has no contiguous border with the Islamic Republic; consequently, Russia would first have to transit a border CIS state before it could roll ground troops across the Iranian border. A Russian invasion using only airborne forces would not be nearly adequate.

Several unconfirmed reports surfaced in 1992 describing illicit transfers of three nuclear weapons from Kazakhstan to Iran.

Nuclear Jihad

The most dangerous military development in regard to the Iranian Republic is its increased access to CIS nuclear weapons, technology, and scientists. Reportedly, the CIA has asserted that Iran's indigenous nuclear weapons programs could take eight years to produce functional munitions.[2] However, the CIA's estimate does not include the variables of potentially proliferated CIS nuclear assets which could accelerate and expand Iran's programs.

Given the extraordinary fragility of the CIS's fledgling democracies, one cannot overlook the possibility of an outright sale or abduction of CIS-controlled nuclear arms themselves, let alone their component parts or technical specifications. In fact, several unconfirmed reports surfaced in 1992 describing illicit transfers of three nuclear weapons from Kazakhstan to Iran.[3]

Just a handful of nuclear weapons would provide Iran, or the multiple terrorist organizations it sponsors, a nuclear blackmail capability. Confronting terrorism will take on new meaning in the future when the threat is a hydrogen car bomb parked in New York, Los Angeles, or inside Washington D.C.

The U.S. recognizes the danger of a fruitful Iranian nuclear program and has proposed a ban to prevent any nation from assisting Teheran in this area. Yet few Western nations have fully complied with the restrictions. Profits on dual-use technology items are simply too high for most nations to sacrifice in an internationally recessed economy. Many non-Western nations have virtually ignored the ban; in fact, China, North Korea, and Pakistan each aid Iran's nuclear program.

The U.S. also has not been able to prevent Iran from buying conventional arms. Intelligence sources assess the IRI's current spending on conventional rearmament alone to be approximately two billion dollars a year.[4] In recent months, Iran has procured three kilo-class diesel submarines from Russia in addition to various aircraft, armored vehicles, and assorted acquisitions from other countries.

The IRI gained 91 free Soviet fighters from Iraqi Gulf War defections and has ordered over 100 more aircraft from Russia These include:

- ☐ 2 Ilyushin IL-76's (airborne control).
- ☐ 24 MiG-27's (some D/J versions—nuclear delivery capable).
- ☐ 48 MiG-29's.
- ☐ 24 MiG-31's.
- ☐ 12 Tu-22M3's (supersonic strategic bombers) [6]

Iran has significantly increased its short- and medium-range missile inventory since the War of the Cities during the Iran-Iraq conflict While Iran's conventional force capability does not equal the Iraqi military of 1990, it continues to grow unchecked and could possibly compete with the region's greatest military powers by the turn of the century.

Since the USSR's demise, Iran has pursued active policies entailing exportation of politico-religious dogma and exploration of economic ties with the six Islamic CIS states. Jerrold Green, Director of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at the University of Arizona, comments:

As part of its Central Asian push, it founded the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), which held its initial meeting in Teheran last February. Teheran created the group almost as a northern tier counterpart to the GCC [Gulf Cooperative Council], and persuaded Turkey, Pakistan, and the six new Islamic states north of the Caspian to join...the ECO gathering in Teheran was soon followed by another meeting attended by Iran, Afghanistan, and Tajikistan, which now comprise a new association of Persian-speaking countries.[7]

The IRI is aware of the unstable political nature of these fledgling Islamic nations and is making every effort to persuade them to adopt the Iranian Islamic fundamentalist model as the prototype for their governments.

Teheran has seized all the opportunities stemming from the USSR's disintegration. Before its collapse, the Soviet Union had encouraged Iran's large Azeri population to seek political autonomy or inclusion into the Azeri state of Azerbaijan.[8] Although the IRI still faces this threat from Azerbaijan, it has used its role as mediator between Armenia and Azerbaijan to

successfully circumvent the separatist aspirations of its Azeri citizenry.

Coupled with the USSR's disintegration, Iraq's defeat presented Teheran with a unique chance to exploit the current Mideast situation. Iran maintains mixed or warm relations with all of its other bordering countries.

The outcome of the Persian Gulf War enabled Iran to shift its political and military focus on offen-

sive, expansionist courses of action. There is substantial evidence that Iran supported the Shiite rebellion in the aftermath of the Gulf War. If the Iraqi Shiites gain political control over part or all of Iraq, such a state might become the surrogate of the IRI.

Only the U.S. stands in the way of a move by Iran to control the Persian Gulf. In April 1992, the Gulf Cooperative Council stood by helplessly as Iran seized the island of Abu Musa.[9] The United Arab Emirates, which claims Abu Musa as its territory, could do nothing but protest as it watched Iran expel its citizens and reportedly station silkworm missiles on the island.[10]

Iran took full advantage of the anti-Iraq Gulf War atmosphere to smooth relations with Islamic regimes it had previously attempted to subvert or overthrow. During 1991, Iran renewed diplomatic relations with several Arab states, including Jordan, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia.[11] Teheran has taken great pains to expand links with Turkey and Saudi Arabia, the two nations which could pose the greatest obstacles to Iranian inroads into Muslim CIS nations.

Few Rivals

Several other powers have the potential to vie with Iran for regional preeminence: Turkey, Egypt, and Syria each has the military potential to bid for regional hegemony later in the decade However, none of these three sponsor ideologies as potent as Iran's brand of Islamic fundamentalism. Moreover, the governments and populations of Egypt and Turkey have somewhat subscribed to democratic principles. Only Syria, a repressive, militant dictatorship, has both the military potential and the motive to seek regional power.

Yet Syria did not benefit from recent events in the USSR. Until Syria can make a lasting peace with Israel, the only power Damascus will be able to project beyond its borders will be through its support of various terrorist organizations.

The former Soviet Union had always supported Syria in its wars with Israel. Today the Assad regime faces the harsh reality that any conflict with Israel entails hostilities with a state backed by the world's only, superpower, the United States.

Unlike Damascus, Teheran has few worries about the region's greatest military power, Israel. Iran can continue to fuel domestic and regional anti-Israeli fervor because it can take solace in the knowledge that Israel poses no ground threat to its territory. Iran's strong anti-Israeli stance has improved its standing among the international, radical Islamic community. Iran can only benefit from a future, non-nuclear Arab-Israeli war, as it would be one of the few major regional powers to survive relatively unscathed.

Exportation of Radical Islam

Iran would greatly enhance its position if it could turn the region against the U.S. and toward its own Islamic fundamentalism. Iran's most appealing national asset is its authentic, politico-religious ideology. Whether or not they concur with Iran's orthodoxy, all segments of the Islamic world perceive the IRI first and foremost as a religious state. The Iranian regime has successfully portrayed itself as a puritanically devout institution and the Saudi monarchy as a corrupt, hypocritical facade.[12]

Iran uses its own revolution as the model for others it is fomenting in many conservative Islamic nations It is working closely with Lebanese terrorist groups and Sudan's radical regime to coerce or subvert other nations into following the Iranian fundamentalist prototype. Egyptian Interior Minister Abdel-Halim Moussa contends that there are over 2,000 Iranian revolutionary guards in Sudan training Muslim extremists in terrorist tactics.[13] Jerrold Green cites that "to this day Iran supports anti-government Islamic fundamentalist groups in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Tunisia, and even on the Israeli-occupied West Bank"[14]

The IRI's most obvious national failing is the poor performance of the Iranian economy. Economic growth has fluctuated widely and unpredictably, from increases in GDP of 8 percent a year between 1981 and 1985 to a decline of 10 percent in 1986.[15] IRI's current inflation rate is nearly 50 percent.[16] Only the increased oil revenues Iran incurred due to the Gulf War provide the funds to expand its military programs.[17] The nationalization of industry has resulted in low productivity and inefficiency.[18]

> Sizable ethnic minorities threaten to fracture Iran in the same way similar groups have fractured former Yugoslavia and some CIS states.

The Iranian regime has used a classic ploy to divert domestic attention from the economy. Since the revolution, it has focused on external enemies like Iraq, Israel, and the U S. Although Teheran has somewhat masked its economic miscarriages with

spurious, xenophobic condemnations and excuses, it knows that during peacetime it must improve the economy if it is to win domestic support.

The IRI faces more on the home front than just economic trials. Sizable ethnic minorities threaten to fracture Iran in the same way similar groups have fractured former Yugoslavia and some CIS states. The Azeri community is nearly one quarter of Iran's total population. There are also large minorities of Arabs, Bakhtiari, Baluchis, Galakis, Kurds, Lurs, and Mazandaranis—all seek some degree of political or cultural autonomy, some even outright independence. Although Farsi (Persian) is the official language of the IRI, only about half of the country's population speak it as a first language.[19]

Iran has successfully minimized all insurgencies thus far. But the growth and varied success of separatist movements among Iran's northern neighbors will no doubt spur the IRI's minorities to continue their quest for autonomy or secession.

> Notwithstanding the negative effects of purges and defections that occurred in the armed forces after the revolution, the military Teheran has assembled since that era is a religious force high in morale and loyalty to the regime.

One sector that strongly supports Teheran is the Iranian military. In spite of the negative effects of the military's purges and defections after the revolution, the military Tehran has assembled since that era is a religious force high in morale and loyalty to the regime. The Islamic Revolution Guard Corps, otherwise known as the Pasdaran, constitutes one of the regime's main support bases.[20]

At 350,000 men strong, the politicized Pasdaran has earned a position in the Islamic Republic not unlike the Waffen SS in Nazi Germany.[21] Teheran effectively publicizes the sacrifices that human waves of Pasdaran units made attacking Iraqi units during the Iran-Iraq War. The Iranian regime has fully inculcated the Shiite concept of martyrdom into the country's national consciousness.

U.S. Interests

"The Great Satan" has several vital interests in Iran and its capabilities. Teheran's belligerent foreign

U.S. Stategic Interest in Iran
IMPACT: + = Vital, O = Significant, - = Marginal

U.S. INTEREST		Politics	Economics	Foreign policy	Military	Culture	Overall
	Regional Stability	+	O	+	+	O	+
	Spread of Democracy	O	−	+	O	O	O
	Access to ALOC/SLOC*	O	O	+	+	−	O
	Access to Econ. Mkts	O	O	+	+	−	O
	Global Security	O	−	+	+	−	O

* Air and sea lines of communications

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practices have imperiled regional stability and swayed American sentiment since the first days of the Islamic Republic—who can forget the U.S. hostage crisis?[22] Iran's entrance into the nuclear club is one of the gravest challenges the world will face in the near future. While a nuclearized IRI can not threaten the U.S. with invasion or annihilation, it could provide compelling reasons for the U.S. to withdraw its presence from the Mideast through nuclear blackmail.

Conclusion

Despite its economic weakness, Iran has the potential to pose a much greater threat to regional security than Iraq recently posed. The IRI's unique status as the founder of modern Islamic fundamentalism magnetically attracts the globe's various radical Islamic movements toward the Iranian prototype. A downturn in the world economy or an abdication by the U.S. of its commitments in the region could push many delicately balanced pro-Western regimes into the arms of Islamic extremists and an ensuing alliance or proxy state status with Iran.

CPT Crockett received his commission and degree in Political Science from U.C. Berkeley. He has served as an S2 in Korea, a company executive officer and battalion S2 in Germany, and assistant brigade S2 in Southwest Asia. He is currently assigned to the 704th MI Brigade at Fort Meade, MD.

"Ah Harey"- Follow Me - Origins of the Israeli Junior Leadership Doctrine

| Sergeant | Staff Sergeant | Second Lieutenant | Lieutenant | Captain |

by Second Lieutenant Frank K. Sobchak

In the 45 years since Israel's birth, little has remained constant except change. Despite technology and political change, the foundation of the Israeli Army—its junior leadership principles—remains constant. The true durability of these principles clearly shows, as "four additional wars failed to alter Israeli leadership doctrine."[1]

Junior Leadership Tenets

The five basic tenets of Israeli junior leadership are fixed in bedrock: high initiative, low spit-and-polish discipline, high military proficiency, close officer/soldier relationship, and leadership from the front.

1. High initiative. The Israeli army entrusts junior leaders with tremendous amounts of initiative few armies allow. Israeli doctrine states that the leader closest to the battle has the best picture of what is going on and, therefore, should be the decision maker. "When an officer deploys his unit on a mission, he knows not only that he is in charge, but also that he is free to make command decisions as necessary for mission completion, relatively free of the chain of command above him."[2] This rule even allows (on rare occasions) junior leaders, who have

a clearer picture of the current situation, to disobey senior leaders' orders.

2. Low spit-and-polish discipline. Israel's army avoids the trappings of military discipline. "The Israeli soldier's aversion to ceremonies and pomp is too deep to change."[3] Spit-and-polish is not the order of the day, and the personal appearance of Israeli soldiers often shocks foreign armies. Israelis allow, or overlook, beards, long hair, torn uniforms, and unshined boots.

3. High military proficiency. Although Israelis do not stress military bearing, they do stress fighting discipline. There is a tremendous emphasis on tough, realistic military training, and on doing a job right. Since Israel has limited margin for error, their army emphasizes mission accomplishment. Failure is not tolerated at any level.

4. Close officer/soldier relationships. In Israel, junior army leaders have much closer relations with their subordinates than in other countries. "Officers are often called by their first names, or by their nicknames"[4]

5. Leadership from the front. This is one of the Israeli army's major tenets. Officers are expected to set an example and to sacrifice their own needs for the safety and comfort of their men. In combat, officers head a vehicular column, or act as point man in a patrol. This practice is followed all the way up to the highest levels, and brigade or *Ugdah* (roughly equivalent to a division) commanders often fight from the front in the thick of combat. It is one of the few armies where armor brigade commanders fight from a tank rather than a command vehicle. Somber evidence of this policy is KIA rates for Israeli officers that are far out of proportion to their makeup in the army.[5] Indeed, Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) take pride in this statistic.

Historical Precedent

Two former underground Jewish defense organizations, in particular, laid the foundation for the modern Israeli leadership style. "The newly formed

IDF officers' corps inherited the Palmach command ethic."[6] Early organizations such as the Haganah and the Palmach formed the backbone of the infant Israeli army. Instead of erasing the traditions and style of these organizations, the IDF inherited them.

Informal Senior/Subordinate Relations

Both the Palmach and the Haganah were outlawed underground organizations. "It is important to understand that the Israeli Defense Force has its roots in organizations that by modern standards would be judged.. as either genuine freedom fighters or genuine terrorists."[7] The British arrested and imprisoned members if they could catch them, as England vigorously attempted to maintain a hold on Palestine.

In underground organizations such as these, formal rank structure and organization have less influence on leadership than in a conventional army. Palmach "discipline was never rigid, few salutes were offered, and the men considered their officers as friends rather than distant symbols of authority."[8] Leaders could not rely on the power of their rank to get subordinates to comply with orders. Instead, they resorted to other means.

The army's commanders tended to handle military problems in a manner which can best be described as intellectual as opposed to authoritarian; this reflected the whole weight of Jewish tradition as well as the egalitarian social atmosphere of the *Yishuv*. Orders were commonly formulated after open debate. Rank often carried less weight than sound arguments. Orders could rarely be imposed by the sheer authority of superior rank.[9]

the Palmach and Haganah set the standard for the close leader/subordinate relationships of today's Israeli army. Formed in 1948, the army continued this Haganah and Palmach policy. Even today, it is not uncommon to observe Israeli conscripts calling a general officer by his first name or nickname.

Initiative and Creativity

Initiative and creativity are key aspects of leadership the Israeli army adopted from the Palmach and Haganah. Palmach training methods "emphasized individual responsibility and leaders' independence of action, even squad leaders were trained and indoctrinated to be independent commanders rather than subordinate NCOs."[10] Due to manpower shortages, every soldier not only had to be able to do his own job, but he also had to be able to do another soldier's job.

"The disadvantages under which the Israeli army operated during the War of Independence evolved a military philosophy based on flexibility and the use of surprise and innovation."[11] The underground Haganah and Palmach had to use unorthodox methods. These organizations never had enough weapons, especially heavy weapons. Leaders relied on their imagination to find ways to arm their soldiers. They often stole weapons from drunk British soldiers, paid British soldiers to "look the other way," or bought arms on the black market.

"Emphasis was laid on the inculcation of a flexibility of thought in the officers in the field."[12] Leaders learned to use whatever was on hand. The first Israeli armor was modified armored cars and inoperable tanks the Haganah and Palmach stole from a Royal Army Ordnance Corps dump and pieced together.[13] Creativity was key in the Palmach and Haganah, and set the tone for future Israeli junior officer doctrine.

Military Proficiency

"Even as Haganah strength grew and its forces became increasingly sophisticated, no attempt was made to establish a regular NCO corps."[14] This tradition continues today, for the Israeli NCO corps is merely in transition to becoming officers. Career progression in the Israeli army can be compared to that of Napoleon's army where every private carried a field marshal's baton in his rucksack. Soldiers must serve in the enlisted ranks before even being considered for commissioning. After 12 to 18 months, the best conscripts attend a squad leader's course. After graduation, soldiers serve another 6 to 10 months as squad leaders before the best go to OCS.[15] Every officer goes through this process, which is devoid of social or political influence.

Leaders have to show their military proficiency and skill in order to earn their subordinates' respect. A Haganah or Palmach leader was the best soldier in that unit. This tradition is carried on today. "Following the example of the Palmach and the Haganah, the best soldier on the team will become the team leader, and the best among the team leaders will become an officer."[16]

Today, the Israeli army officer's "claim to leadership rests in his ability to demonstrate that he is the first soldier in the unit, the best of the breed."[17] This legacy lives in today's doctrine.

Israeli junior officer doctrine emphasizes leading from the front. "Indeed, the roots of this 'follow me' leadership style go back to the Palmach generation."[18] Leaders had to lead by example to motivate their men. "The only special right accorded to (Palmach) commanders was that they were expected to lead during an attack and stay behind to cover a retreat."[19]

A rebel leader must have special qualities which many regular, organized army leaders do not need. In an underground organization, leaders were closer to their subordinates than in a regular army. First name basis was common, and leaders shared the same conditions as their subordinates. These leaders and soldiers were usually neighbors, lived together, or were even related.

Culture

Elements of Jewish culture affected the development of the Israeli junior leadership style. The Israeli army's ethics are a reflection of the society. Common Jewish history such as the Holocaust and the *Kibbutz* tremendously influenced the origins of the junior leadership doctrine.

The Holocaust

The universal Jewish experience of the Holocaust greatly shaped junior leadership style. What is known as the Holocaust Syndrome plays a tremendous role in Israeli thinking. The Holocaust Syndrome is a belief that the State of Israel's survival is constantly in jeopardy. This belief drives the principle that only the strong survive.

This Darwinistic belief is enforced because, to many Jews, the survival of Israel depends on the quality of their armed forces, and especially its leaders. With Israel's encircled geopolitical situation, the possibility of another Holocaust is dangerously real. Many Israelis have developed a "siege" mentality. "There is no margin for error in competence because Israel is encircled by well-equipped armies and subjected to terrorist raids."[20]

Consequently, Israelis have a sense of what they call no alternative: they cannot accept defeat because defeat would mean extermination. "No alternative is the root cause of everything—lives are at stake."[21] This concept guides officer selection. "In the words of Rafael Eytan, the IDF's chief of staff from 1978 to 1983: 'We select our officers in the same way we built this country, allowing only the best to lead because the consequences of failure in any one area are so devastating.'"[22] The army does this through extensive testing and competition. At *Bahad 1*, the officer candidate training base, attrition is nearly 50 percent.

The Holocaust also promoted high initiative among junior leaders in the Israeli army. Many non-European Jews could not believe that six million Jews were exterminated without any major resistance. To these *Sabras* (Jews native to Israel), those passive Jews merely accepted their fate and walked to the gas chambers.[23]

To ensure this never happens again, the Israeli army instituted aggressiveness and initiative into their junior leadership doctrine. As noted, Israelis prefer to disobey orders than to do nothing in a combat situation. "There have been occasions when soldiers who have refused to obey what seemed to them unlawful orders have been exonerated."[24]

The Kibbutz

The *Kibbutz* (rural farm collectives) has its influence on leadership style. The rate of commissioned officers from *Kibbutzim* is 40 percent more than their portion of the population.[25]

When an Israeli grows up on a *Kibbutz*, he is usually better prepared for military service than his city cousin. "The collective framework of their (*Kibbutz*) upbringing and idealistic education, as well as a closeness to nature and a developed sense of responsibility toward the group, seem to suit them for army life."[26] In addition, many *Kibbutzim* are located near the borders, and members must defend themselves against guerrilla raids. *Kibbutzniks* have often seen combat before they enter the army.

Israel's Size

Israel's size is also a factor in the formation of the mind-set of the Israeli army officer. "Israel is a small country, and people you command are likely not to be total strangers, but friends or relatives."[27] "Everybody (in Israeli society) seems to know each other. This familiarity makes it difficult for officers to create what would be an artificial distance between themselves and subordinates."[28] As a result, Israeli officers cannot rely on the authority of rank to get things done.

Key Leaders

Key army leaders molded much of the junior leader doctrine. "In a very interesting way, the IDF's fighting spirit has been drawn from certain individuals who played key roles during the formulative years of the IDF."[29] Many of the original top Israeli leaders put their stamp on the Israeli army, each with a specific purpose, or modification that he wanted to make.

Moshe Dayan. Moshe Dayan, who fought in the War for Independence and later became chief of staff, had the greatest effect on the Israeli army. "Dayan wanted officers who were fighting men rather than managers in uniform, (and) he wanted training which stressed combat skills rather than parade ground drills."[30]

Dayan wanted to build his own shell for what the Israeli officer should be: accomplishment of the mission was of primary importance. Dayan "de-emphasized outward appearance, ceremony, and for-

mal discipline and instead stressed the primacy of its (the army's) combat mission."[31] He deemed courage on the battlefield, military performance, and good leadership essential. According to Dayan, "Officers do not send their men into battle, they lead them into battle."[32]

Dayan instilled this into the army by creating Unit 101. An elite commando force, Unit 101 executed reprisal raids in retaliation for Arab terrorist raids. It used aggressive tactics with high junior officer initiative, and emphasized battle proficiency. "Unit 101 became a role model to which other units in the IDF could aspire."[33] Dayan guided the development of doctrine to follow the principles of Unit 101. Today, Israeli army officers still emphasize resourcefulness, initiative, and proficiency.

Ariel Sharon. While Ariel Sharon commanded Unit 101, other officers emulated his style. Sharon soon became Moshe Dayan's protege. Dayan, in his attempt to model the entire army after Unit 101, chose to merge it with the paratroop unit. He put Sharon in charge of this new unit, known as Unit 202. Sharon instilled many of his own leadership principles into this new unit which was to form the backbone of the Israeli army.

Sharon commanded Unit 202 in the Battle of Mitla Pass in 1956. Dayan ordered him to secure the approaches to the pass. Instead of following orders, he attacked to secure the heights in the pass, and took heavy casualties. His aggressiveness drew him into an unnecessary battle which caused many casualties, but he was not punished. This spirit of aggressiveness, the ability to not sit back and let things happen around you, has become one of the tenets of Israel's junior leadership style.

As his operational commander, Dayan personally supported the decision:

Several officers of the General Staff observed to me (Dayan), with disapproval, that my behavior towards the paratroopers is too forgiving. I can imagine a situation where I would decide to seize a tactical position to give a secure base to my unit even if my action were contrary to GHQ orders. I can well believe that a commander could behave in this way quite innocently in the conviction that staff officers, who were not in the area, could not know the conditions nor the enemy position, and that only the man on the spot was capable of appreciating the situation and taking a correct decision.[34]

This concept gives great freedom to lower level officers, and also became part of the Israeli army's leadership doctrine.

(Note: Because of modern technology, soldiers at all levels have better intelligence today than they did in 1956. This would probably have precluded Sharon's error in judgment.)

Summary

Change is nothing new to the Middle East, and the Israeli army has fought to keep up with it. Although the Israeli army continues to keep pace with change, the foundation for its leadership ethos that was established over three decades ago remains valid today.

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2LT Frank K. Sobchak is the BICC for 3d Battalion, 69th Armor, Fort Stewart, GA. A former enlisted combat engineer, he was commissioned at the United States Military Academy with a bachelor's degree in Military History.

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USAREUR CI: Protecting the Force

by Captain Paul Czarzasty

During Operations Desert Storm and Provide Comfort, the MI community learned that there were problems with counterintelligence (CI) communications. To correct this problem and to provide CI force protection in support of contingency operations, a deployable secure communications system has been developed for CI teams in support of the commander.

USAREUR has developed a prototype CI telecommunications package called the Theater Rapid Response Intelligence Package (TRRIP). The package—

☐ Is lightweight and man-portable.
☐ Uses state-of-the-art automatic data processing software.
☐ Maintains a data base of theater and national intelligence.
☐ Stores preformatted CI reports.

TRRIP was first successfully field tested during Exercise Dragon Hammer in May 1992. There it supported the deployment of V Corps to Sardinia. Accurate and timely force protection intelligence was transmitted from the USAREUR Combat Intelligence Readiness Facility in Augsburg, Germany, to the TRRIP on Sardinia. National and theater level intelligence was focused on the needs of the V Corps commander.

Operation Provide Promise

USAREUR CI personnel continue to play an active role in providing multidiscipline CI force protection to commanders conducting contingency and peacekeeping operations. Using the TRRIP, CI soldiers are currently providing force protection intelligence to the commander of Joint Task Force Provide Promise.

The commander needs to know how well the enemy can see his forces, through human intelligence, signals intelligence ships, ground-based communications intercept sites, and satellites. He also needs to know the terrorist threat level in his area of operations. Using TRRIP, CI teams can assess the commander's vulnerability to hostile intelligence collection and the terrorist threat. CI teams also use TRRIP to focus current force protection intelligence to satisfy the needs of the commander no matter where he is deployed.

CI TRRIP teams in USAREUR consist of a 97B (CI) staff sergeant and a 35E (CI) captain. This team uses the TRRIP telecommunications system to transmit and receive CI data through a secure voice, data, and FAX capability. The CI team concept allows one soldier to operate the TRRIP and conduct CI analysis while the other soldier gathers local threat information. TRRIP provides tailored theater and national level intelligence through data transfers that answer JTF Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR) and force protection intelligence from USAREUR.

Intelligence from the USAREUR Defense Intelligence Threat Data System (UDITDS), which has unlimited storage and retrieval of message traffic, was provided to the JTF J2. The UDITDS software on the TRRIP provided automated analytical tools for analysis and generation of timely assessments This data base routinely answered JTF PIR "on time" and accurately on subjects ranging from the terrorist threat to tactical intelligence. The TRRIP provided the commander daily access to national level intelligence concerning his areas of operations and interest.

The Package

The TRRIP includes two laptop computers. DOS Grid 1550 PC produces CI reports and DD-173 messages using DINAH-MITE software. The PC also is loaded with Word Perfect for data processing, ProComm for data transfers, and has Foto Touch for

transmitting secure pictures to another computer with Foto Touch software. The package also has a hand scanner for scanning documents into the computer's hard drive. The UNIX-based Sony NEWS Laptop PC is loaded with the UDITDS and special CI applications. Both laptops are linked to the Diconix Inkjet Printer.

The suite has its own secure communications capability through a STU-III secure telephone for voice and data transmissions via host-nation telephone systems. Furthermore, TRRIP has a land satellite system for use in locations where telephones are unavailable or unreliable. If direct current electricity is not available, TRRIP comes with a 12-volt battery to power the system for up to an hour, depending on the system configuration. It can also work off a car battery or cigarette lighter. The whole system is transported in three suitcases.

TRRIP's most critical feature is its ability to provide a deploying force a communications link with theater and national level intelligence agencies. These agencies are most capable of responding to PIR within a contingency area of operations. During Operation Provide Promise, TRRIP focused intelligence down to the commander. Using the UDITDS, intelligence analysts at USAREUR in Heidelberg, Germany, screened hundreds of messages a day, sorted the message traffic, and electronically transferred the files to TRRIP via commercial phone line or satellite. Once the file was received, a TRRIP team member could use the powerful UDITDS analytical tools to—

☐ Sort traffic.

☐ Conduct word and concept searches.

☐ Produce focused intelligence assessments based on the commander's need for force protection intelligence.

A Tactical Intelligence Tool

TRRIP's versatility makes it a vital intelligence tool. TRRIP is versatile in both its configuration and analytical capabilities. Originally designed to provide force protection and

counterterrorism intelligence, TRRIP can receive all national-level intelligence. During Operation Provide Promise, TRRIP also provided current and accurate tactical intelligence in the Balkans, although it was never intended to perform this function. TRRIP provided the JTF a current intelligence data base and secure communications (FAX, data, and voice) with theater and national intelligence agencies.

Commercial power and phone lines often failed. When this occurred, the land satellite provided the only secure and nonsecure communications for the JTF.

JTF Operation Provide Promise received the most recent all-source information regarding hostile intelligence collection and the terrorist threat. Using TRRIP, force protection information was sent daily from theater level to the JTF. Information gathered through a liaison was also sent from the forward deployed TRRIP to theater and national data bases. This bottom-up exchange of information helped provide force protection for the JTF and assisted contingency planning.

Force protection intelligence from CI analysis, using TRRIP, was critical to the JTF commander. TRRIP and the CI team demonstrated another way that CI soldiers are supporting commanders in USAREUR.

CPT Czarzasty is the commander of Detachment 4, Alpha Company, 18th MI Battalion, Heidelberg, Germany. A graduate of Rutgers University, Czarzasty was the Deputy J2 during JTF Operation Provide Promise (Forward), in Zagreb, Croatia.

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
by Lieutenant Colonel Victor M. Rosello

Although history will ultimately be the judge, it appears that the delicate Salvadoran peace and reconciliation process is taking root as that country begins to enjoy the fruits of its new burgeoning democratic reality. Throughout this arduous 12-year period of conflict, the U.S. government provided over four billion dollars in military aid—in the name of regional stability, democratization, anticommunism, and the professionalization of El Salvador's armed forces (ESAF).

Many military professionals do not realize, due to the low-profile nature of U.S. military training assistance, that the U.S. Army Intelligence Center played a major role in bringing the conflict to an end. It supported the U.S. intelligence effort and the development of ESAF professionalism.

The Intelligence Center provided training products in response to requests for training support from U.S. military trainers in the field. It enthusiasti-

cally supported the LATAM COOP (Latin American Cooperation Program) which exposed ESAF intelligence officers to our professional environment and served as the model for their own development.

Most important, through sound doctrine and effective instructional blocks at MIOBC and MIOAC, the Intelligence Center provided many young U.S. MI officers serving as trainers and advisors in El Salvador with the knowledge and expertise needed to build the foundation for the ESAF's tactical intelligence system and organization.

One-year unaccompanied rotations were the norm as these Huachuca-trained professionals, loaded with high aspirations, set out to instruct their counterparts on the basics of tactical intelligence. They lived, ate, worked, and slept in the same

facilities as their counterparts—old infantry brigade buildings which were often the target of mortar fire or sapper attacks from Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) guerrillas.

Because of the isolated environment in which the U.S. trainers operated, the observations, comments, and opinions expressed by those who served are based on the playing field in which they operated during their one-year tours. For every U.S MI trainer assigned to El Salvador, there is a unique perspective which highlights different aspects of the conflict. The differences are as striking as the names of the places where they worked: San Salvador, Santa Ana, San Miguel, Chalatenango, San Vicente, and Usulutan—names that will live in the memories of those who served there.

The areas of operation for each of the Salvadoran infantry brigades were unique in many ways and were shaped in terms of their geography, relative importance to the war, proximity to the threat, and, above all, the personalities of the Salvadoran commanders and their staffs who fought for the survival of their nation.

The training began with a three-man mobile training team (MTT) that arrived in El Salvador in September 1981, and grew to the nine-man training group which continued to support the cease-fire following the signing of the Peace Accords in January 1992. In El Salvador, MI officers provided the training support and assistance which has come to characterize MI commitment to professional excellence around the world.

The effectiveness of the intelligence training program is tangible and can be demonstrated by the improvement in tactical intelligence support to the ESAF battalion and brigade commanders during the conflict. Institutionally, the ESAF's own intelligence branch school came of age, and continues to provide basic and advanced intelligence instruction to its members.

Colonel Jaime Suarez, the former Chief of Intelligence (C-II) of the Salvadoran Joint Command Headquarters, comments:

Throughout the conflict U.S. military intelligence training and assistance made numerous contributions toward improvement of the ESAF's intelligence organization. However, if I were to identify one contribution that made the greatest difference, overall, it would have to be your teaching of Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB). In my opinion this technique has revolutionized the way that intelligence now supports the field units. My only regret is that you didn't institutionalize it earlier in the conflict. If you had, we could have avoided the numerous military setbacks suffered

by our forces in the field during the early '80's. San Salvador, April 22, 1993

In the articles that follow, the authors—the last group of MI field advisors to serve in El Salvador—have attempted to provide a snapshot look at their work and some of the contributions made to the Salvadoran tactical intelligence effort overall.

Although El Salvador is quickly fading from...attention, its lessons can be useful in any mission our branch may be assigned.

Since the MI advisory program is being phased out, these articles may be the last "hurrah" in the twilight of the U.S. MI Training Support Mission to El Salvador. Although written at the tail end of the conflict, these articles reflect the dynamics, character, and frustrations inherent in military assistance missions of this nature both during war and in the post-conflict period. These articles also emphasize the multidimensional nature of the MI profession in general.

Read what these authors have to say, reflect on their personal experiences, contemplate the nature of intelligence in this environment, and then draw your own conclusions. Although El Salvador is quickly fading from national, international, and our military's attention, its lessons can be useful in any mission our branch may be assigned.

If U.S. forces were to be involved in a Bosnian-like scenario, they would operate in the Byzantine world of coalition warfare and combined operations with U.N. peacekeeping forces. They would also operate with host-country military counterparts and the diversity of challenges that entails.

Direct combat roles are only one aspect of the many missions involved in countering the threats arising from the new world order. Advisory, training, and humanitarian assistance missions are also receiving their fair share of attention. It is to our advantage to pause and reflect on the impact of this and on how we view our own unit's Mission Essential Task List, battle tasks, and even our entire go-to-war mentality and corresponding mission statements. The military institution will benefit in the long run as we prepare to meet these yet undefined challenges of tomorrow.

LTC Rosello is the XO, 313th MI Battalion, 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, NC. He has a BA from the University of Puerto Rico and an MA from the University of Chicago. He has served in various MI tactical and joint positions in Korea, Panama, and El Salvador. He served as the 313th's S3 during Operation Just Cause.

The Role of an MI Advisor in EL SALVADOR

by Captain Marcos R. Mendez

When I arrived at "my" brigade, I asked the El Salvadoran Army Brigade S2 how much intelligence training his unit had conducted in the last six months. He proudly proclaimed that the unit had conducted seven courses and had trained over a hundred soldiers on tactical intelligence. I was pleasantly surprised, until I found out that the training did not come close to meeting U.S. Army training conditions and standards. I knew then that I had my work cut out for me.

I was an MI advisor in El Salvador for almost a year, having come here immediately after the Peace Accords were signed. I stayed in El Salvador through the period of the Cease-Fire Agreement (CFA) which lasted until December 15, 1992. In this article I will describe how the training of tactical intelligence was planned and conducted during this period.

This may be the first time U.S. Army intelligence advisors have worked in a friendly country through the period of an "Armed Peace." This is a term the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) used to describe that tenuous period when both sides—El Salvador Armed Forces (ESAF) and the FMLN—conducted a separation of forces operation. This meant that they concentrated their units into designated areas within the country under U.N. supervision, but still kept their weapons and equipment.

The Unit and the Environment

The unit I supported is the 4th Infantry Brigade, located in the 4th Military Zone in Chalatenango Department. The brigade is based near the small town of El Paraiso, about 60 miles north of San Salvador, the capital.

This base, clustered between small hills, was the site of three major guerrilla attacks, including the 1987 sapper and mortar attack in which a U.S. Army Special Forces NCO was killed. To the north, this zone shares a common border with Honduras; on the west with Santa Ana Department; to the east, Cabanas Department; and to the south, the Department of San Salvador.

The 4th Infantry Brigade has three infantry battalions, one military detachment (DM), and a support company. The DM is organized with two infantry battalions and one support company. The infantry battalions are organized with three infantry companies, a recondo platoon, and a headquarters section.

These battalions don't have battalion staffs, so they are simply described as large companies. The only intelligence organizations are at brigade and at DM level. There are no intelligence sections at battalion level; however, the ESAF is undergoing a massive reorganization in which all infantry battalions will stand up complete staffs.

The brigade intelligence section consists of a major, a captain, two lieutenants, and a task force slice of about 123 enlisted soldiers and NCOs from the MI Battalion (BIM). The brigade S2 section consists of an administrative subsection with 8 people, a support subsection with 7, an intelligence operations subsection with 46, a CI subsection with 47, and a Regional Analysis Center (CAR) with 18.

CAR is the Spanish acronym for the Regional Intelligence Centers (RICs) that supported the brigades with all-source intelligence during the

height of the conflict. Each one of these subsections has its own organization and elements.

The DM intelligence section is organized similar to the brigade with less personnel authorized and only two officers: a captain and a lieutenant. Other than the officers and two other soldiers assigned to the brigade/DM, the rest are assigned to the BIM. These soldiers are attached in direct support to the DM.

With large, complex, and unwieldy organizations like these, you can imagine how hard it is to organize and execute intelligence training. However, through the war years most of these soldiers performed their intelligence tasks daily. One way or another, they maintained a minimum proficiency level. Soldiers performed their own specifically assigned tasks and no more. The section was operational on a 24-hour-shift basis.

After the Peace Accords were signed, the flow of information into the intelligence section significantly decreased. After 12 years of conflict and a constant information flow, the sections suddenly found themselves without much to do. This could have been a great opportunity to train; however, this was not the case.

Training Philosophy

The ESAF had received instruction on U.S. Army training management doctrine (**FM 25-100, Training the Force,** and **FM 25-101, Battle Focused Training**) from U.S. operations and training advisors. My predecessor, together with other MI advisors in country, had developed a proposed METL and battle tasks for the intelligence sections. The battle tasks were comprehensive and reflected the realities of the environment in El Salvador. However, convincing Salvadoran intelligence officers of the advantages of these techniques was a different story entirely.

Still another hurdle was to get my counterpart to make a firm commitment to plan long-range training. Simply writing a training schedule for the S2 section was unheard of until recently.

Keep in mind that during the war, the ESAF generated little paperwork for training. Everyone was busy doing one thing—fighting guerrillas. U.S. MI advisors were kept busy helping their counterparts run the RICs and maintain the collection, production, and flow of intelligence in support of brigade commanders and maneuver battalion commanders. Training schedules were not a priority during the height of the conflict.

During this time, ESAF intelligence training consisted of training courses planned by one of the most experienced Salvadoran NCOs in the brigade. This NCO usually belonged to the group of instruc-

tors of the operations subsection within the S2. His task was to write the courses based on the available instructors and their experiences.

The D2/S2 had the final approval of these courses. Six months of training for intelligence personnel was written up and approved without ever considering the unit's mission statement, METL, or the intelligence needs of the organization. Again, this is not a criticism, but simply a fact of life for an army transitioning from war to peace. (Additionally, some National Intelligence School courses were included in this planning.)

The courses were designed to train about 18 to 28 soldiers per course. The Brigade S3 selected the soldiers without ever considering their aptitude. Many could not even pass a polygraph test on their loyalty. Soldiers were often selected only because they could read and write.

If you had never before advised an army of a Third World country, you begin to appreciate the advantages of our education system.

One aspect of intelligence training which has been neglected in El Salvador is basic intelligence skills training for the infantry soldier. Specifically, training on SALUTE reporting, camouflage procedures, hasty interrogation and prisoner of war handling, and enemy doctrine.

Soldiers normally get four hours of intelligence training during their basic course. Unless the soldiers go on to special courses such as recondo, they don't receive any additional intelligence training. We are trying to change this as the ESAF develops a new training doctrine. Tactical intelligence training will be included as part of infantry common soldier's tasks.

The Advisor's Role

Advisors help the ESAF execute the training they themselves plan. We provide visual aids and even teach some classes. We even manage to influence the selection of certain courses over others and to help prepare programs of instruction.

Of course, frustration comes with the territory. Frustration after training soldiers to be intelligence specialists, who return to their units to do non-intelligence duties. Updating lesson plans was another source of frustration. Often, lesson plans needed to be written from scratch because they were out of date. We have had limited results in this area. One reason is that our work was local and personalized. If the unit commander, XO, or S3 liked you, you got a lot more done.

Until now, we had not been able to make institutional changes. Once the brigade S2 rotated to another unit, we had to rebuild everything over again

with the new S2. Another reason our gains were limited was because there were no intelligence sections at battalion level. Once soldiers completed the courses, they went back to their units and never practiced intelligence skills.

This situation is changing, however, with the reorganization of all battalions. The new battalion TOE includes an intelligence section much like U.S. battalions. The only difference is that their battalion S2 section will have an intelligence captain, a CI captain, and two NCOs.

The new unit organization requires a new training plan for the brigade and the DM. This plan, similar to the one the U.S. Army uses, covers training for intelligence personnel as well as infantry soldiers. Battalion NCOs and officers provide tactical intelligence training to the infantry soldiers.

In any case, the S2 sections will always conduct training themselves, if necessary. This includes: SALUTE reporting; tactical interrogations; POW handling; camouflage and concealment; guerrilla tactics, equipment, weapons, and techniques; terrain evaluation—OCOKA; and SAEDA. These should be conducted as hip-pocket type training during individual task training for a particular unit.

Intelligence personnel learn collection, information processing, dissemination, and the use of intelligence, order of battle, counterintelligence, and IPB in both conventional warfare and Operations Other Than War. In addition, soldiers should also attend more technical schools at the *Escuela Nacional de Inteligencia (ESNACIN)*. The training should be conducted periodically, at least four hours a week.

Intelligence personnel within the section, as well as officers, should conduct this training. More technical intelligence training, such as SIGINT and HUMINT, should be taught at the *ESNACIN* or through seminars conducted by experts outside the organization. These recommendations should work no matter what training management doctrine the ESAF adopts.

These tasks are in line with the METL and battle tasks proposed by previous intelligence advisors. The intelligence officers from these units have already implemented these recommendations with minor changes.

Training Distractors

In the ESAF, just like in the U.S. Army, training distractors are a factor. Here, the distractors were many. It began with the institution, which strongly believes that everything should be centralized, and continues with a cultural belief that you are either an officer or a private, nothing in between matters. Consequently, the NCO corps is not strongly supported

in the Salvadoran army.

We are also educating Salvadoran soldiers about the importance of having strong NCOs and how they can enhance training.

Training is so centralized that battalion commanders don't have any input in writing training schedules. Another distractor was the belief that if it isn't a course with a graduation date and diploma it isn't training. The military advisors have devoted a lot of time and energy to change this.

We have taken several approaches to this issue and have been working hard to make everyone understand that training can be conducted any time, any where, and by any one. We are also educating Salvadoran soldiers about the importance of having a strong NCO corps and how they can enhance training.

Another factor we stressed was the use of the unit's mission statement to plan training. All our efforts have been on line with our own training management philosophy, while adapting them to the realities of a country recovering from 12 years of war.

Summary

It is important not to let frustration impede progress. You have to continue driving on with a positive attitude. All of us believe that we have contributed to a significant chapter in the role of Military Intelligence in Operations Other Than War. We are taking notes and writing down our lessons learned so that in the future other intelligence advisors will have an idea of what to expect.

The Special Forces advisors have already written many documents on lessons learned and are working on a manual for future advisors. I have seen most of what they've written, but it has limited application to the MI aspects of advising friendly foreign countries.

Special Forces cannot properly advise on intelligence matters. We need to make sure that, in the future, our intelligence advisors are adequately prepared for the task. I strongly suggest that the Intelligence Center start (if they haven't already) putting together notes taken by previous advisors and, perhaps, draft a technical manual for future intelligence advisors.

CPT Mendez is Chief, Intelligence Training Branch, SOUTH-COM, J2 He was an intelligence advisor for an infantry brigade in El Salvador for a year, and a member of a Subject Matter Expert Exchange Program with the Chilean Special Forces.

MIOAC Preparation for the El Salvador Challenge

by Captain Joseph K. Smith

When MI Branch asked if I would be interested in serving a one-year tour as an intelligence trainer in El Salvador, I was elated. After living in Spain for the first 23 years of my life, and having just come from an overseas tour in Germany, I hesitated for less than a second. This would be a chance to speak my native language on a daily basis. After hanging up the phone I wondered, "My God, what have I gotten myself into?" So, with a little apprehension, I began my assignment to El Salvador.

In 1992, El Salvador was a country just recovering from a 12-year civil war, in the midst of trying to negotiate a peace settlement. There was a lot to learn, so I immediately began to research the country and the region.

El Salvador is the smallest Central American country, roughly the size of Massachusetts. With a population of approximately six million people, it has the largest population density in the region.

From USMILGP El Salvador, I was informed that I would be an MI trainer/advisor to the 5th Military Zone (5MZ). The country is divided into 14 geographical zones called departments from which 6 military zones are formed. Three departments make up the 5MZ: Cabanas in the north, San Vicente in the center, and La Paz in the south. The larger cities by departments are Sensuntepeque, San Vicente, and Zacatecoluca, respectively.

My new home, and 5MZ headquarters, was San Vicente. It is 88 kilometers east of San Salvador along the Pan-American Highway, one of two principle east-west arteries. San Vicente city rests at the foot of the San Vicente volcano, a majestic formation

6,500 feet above sea level. For years during the conflict, this volcano had been a major guerrilla base for hundreds of FMLN insurgents.

U.S. Army MI trainer/advisors, young captains, formed teams with Special Forces majors and senior NCOs assigned to the various military zones. Like any army adjusting to the demands of a peacetime mission, the ESAF was undergoing dramatic changes in its organization. My challenge here was to train 20 recently selected battalion S2s and their sections.

When I got the call from Branch, I was attending the MI Officers Advance Course (MIOAC) at Fort Huachuca. We were just going into the Low Intensity Conflict phase of instruction. With the upcoming tour in El Salvador, my interest level was at its peak. Additionally, after having served in Germany with the 3d Infantry Division (Mech), I was eager to learn new ways of doing business. The results of receiving this academic infusion and learning innovative ways to deal with the challenge of Operations Other Than War proved most rewarding.

Preparation

During MIOAC there were many areas of instruction that prepared me for the challenges I would eventually face in El Salvador. The instruction most critical to my success in El Salvador can be grouped into four areas:

☐ Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB).
☐ Intelligence estimate.
☐ Peacetime Contingency Operations and Peacekeeping Operations.
☐ Staff functions.
☐ PSYOP and Civil Affairs.

IPB

IPB is stressed during two major parts of MIOAC. Our paths crossed during the Brigade and Division Operations and Intelligence (O&I) and LIC blocks of instruction. Brigade and Division O&I did not directly teach IPB, but through the practical exercises

and briefings, its importance became very clear.

Although Brigade and Division O&I dealt with conventional IPB, it strengthened the basics. This part of the course focused on the importance of doing all steps of the IPB process. During LIC instruction, we saw the first change in the IPB process. In terrain analysis, the second phase, we learned that the civilian population is the key, because the people provide logistical, intelligence, and moral support to whichever group they align with.

Many times during the Salvadoran conflict, soldiers entered certain towns, farms, or villages for food The population sympathetic to the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) would sell them poisonous food, or place slivers of glass in soft drink bottles. Another technique was to encourage the soldiers, particularly officers, to get drunk, then interrogate them about future movements or operations.

In most areas in 5MZ, the civilian population supported the ESAF, which gave the military a slight advantage over the insurgents. The importance of the civilian population in Operations Other Than War became a reality for me in El Salvador.

Terrain analysis was also studied in terms of OCOKA. The corresponding overlays were produced in great detail and explained thoroughly because of the small size of the units.

Some of the products we produced during the LIC block of instruction included—

☐ Key Facilities and Target Overlay.
☐ Population Status Overlay.
☐ Lines of Communication Overlay.
☐ Personality Contact Matrix.
☐ Personalities Activities Matrix.

If these products had been available and accurate, the reports and studies from the conflict might have been different. For example, two key bridges across the Rio Lempa—Puente Cuscatlan and Puente de Oro (which unite the eastern and western parts of the country) should have been noted on the Key Facilities and Target Overlay.

The Rio Lempa is a primary source of energy for three of the country's four major hydroelectric facilities and an important logistic corridor for the insurgents. Both of these bridges were destroyed during the conflict, degrading economic and military lines of communication.

One facility which was on the Key Facilities and Target Overlay, but should have been prioritized higher, was the *Ingenio Jiboa*—a sugar cane processing plant that is located approximately six kilometers south-southwest of San Vicente. This plant is one of the major sugar cane processing centers in the country and an extremely important

economic target.

Along this same stretch of highway, leading to the town of Zacatecoluca, is an electrical power station which the guerrillas repeatedly attacked. Because this had been a key facility for the ESAF and because it had not been destroyed, the guerrillas then destroyed the towers that supported the power lines. This cut off electricity to residents in the southern part of 5MZ and some areas in the eastern part of the country.

The Intelligence Estimate

As with IPB, the intelligence estimate was introduced during the Brigade and Division O&I block of instruction. During this phase, most briefings included the intelligence estimate. Many officers in our class had not worked in tactical units, so this allowed them to see that certain commanders stress some areas more than others. To those who had been in conventional units (the majority of the class had been stationed in Germany), the LIC block of instruction opened our eyes to the intelligence estimate as it applies to Operations Other Than War.

The intelligence estimate was a key part of most briefings during LIC exercises. The differences between the conventional and the unconventional intelligence estimates are minimal, but there are some areas which must be addressed.

When discussing the enemy situation in a conventional environment, enemy forces can easily be

Identified, as can the terrain. In a nonconventional environment, however, enemy forces are not always the "guy on the other side of the fence," or "the guy with the AK-47," or "the guy wearing the different uniform." Many times the enemy is the farmer with a cache of weapons stored on his land, or the school teacher who passes military information to enemy forces. In Operations Other Than War, there is no easy way to determine who the enemy is or what his mission is.

The terrain in the intelligence estimate was also discussed. We learned that weather affects the mobility of both friendly and enemy forces. In jungle or heavily forested areas, heavy rains can render trails and river or stream beds impassable. Again, the terrain must be studied in detail because of the capability of small units to operate throughout the area of operations.

As an MI trainer/advisor, I also had to assist incoming battalion S2s. Most of them had attended MIOBC, but had not served in intelligence positions. My job was not only to help them organize their sections, but also to show them how to prepare intelligence estimates for their respective zones and battalion areas of responsibility.

In 5MZ, as in most of El Salvador, the terrain is rugged and mountainous. We tried to improve on the terrain analysis that had been produced during the conflict I never realized how much terrain can actually influence tactics and troop movements.

A good example of this occurred in late October, a critical time for the ESAF, the Government of El Salvador (GOES), and the FMLN. On October 31, 1992, the FMLN was supposed to have completed demobilizing and their weapons destroyed under the supervision of U.N. observers. The 5th Infantry Brigade was running a joint U.S.-ESAF recondo course in San Vicente at the time.

After much coordination with both U.S. and Salvadoran military officials and U.N. observers, we were finally authorized to use a portion of the brigade's training area to conduct patrolling exercises. (NOTE: For over a year the ESAF could not leave their posts to patrol or conduct exercises, according to the Peace Accords.) The area was two square kilometers and included hills and ravines.

The patrol set out at 2130 as the sun set. We walked up and down the hills in complete darkness and observed as recondo course students went through their exercises. Between 0130 and 0200, the order was given to halt. The patrol leader asked our team Special Forces NCO to come to the front of the patrol. We were astonished at what we saw. Approximately 30 to 35 meters to our front was a guerrilla patrol of 8 or 10 people armed with AK-47's and

M-16's.

Here we were observing a guerrilla patrol in our own back yard. The point is that because the terrain was compartmented, we were not able to see them until we were right on top of them. More surprising, the guerrilla patrol never saw or heard us. The importance of good terrain and enemy analysis was racing through my mind. After remaining very still for several minutes until the guerrillas were out of sight, the Special Forces NCO guided the patrol closer to the brigade and continued the exercise and evaluation.

Part of their mission was to verify the demobilization of former FMLN combatants in the 15 Designated Assembly Zones (DAZs) and the turn-in and destruction of weapons.

Peacetime Contingency and Peacekeeping Operations

Certainly, Peacetime Contingency and Peacekeeping Operations will impact future missions. In El Salvador, the U.N. observer force, called the U.N. Organization in El Salvador (ONUSAL), performs peacekeeping operations. Although U.S. military forces did not participate in the U.N. observer operations, U.S. military advisors in El Salvador have frequent contact with U.N. forces.

In some units, military advisors shared information with both the ESAF and ONUSAL. In 5MZ, for example, the ONUSAL passed information to advisors about mine fields they marked along with former FMLN combatants.

One of the important things we learned during LIC instruction is that the enemy can be many groups or many things. We also learned that often in Operations Other Than War, there is no order of battle for enemy forces. MI officers may have to start from scratch and build an order of battle.

LIC instruction examined the complexity of various ongoing missions in the world today. Multinational military, police, and human rights forces were involved in El Salvador. Part of their mission was to verify the demobilization of former FMLN combatants in the 15 Designated Assembly Zones (DAZs) and the turn-in and destruction of weapons.

The Peace Accords designated the DAZs as areas where the FMLN would concentrate during the transition from war to peace. LIC instruction taught the importance of the various missions and made it easier for us to coordinate and cooperate with these types of forces.

Staff Functions

As the MI advisor in 5MZ, I could see the importance of good staff coordination and planning The ESAF brigades are currently restructuring into four infantry battalions. These battalions are forming new S2 staff sections to support these newly designated battalions.

Part of my mission was to teach the ESAF that the S2 is an integral part of the staff. He must work with other staff sections instead of operating in isolation. As the brigade was structured, the S3 was in charge of all training, except intelligence training, which was kept on a separate calendar. To make better use of training resources and personnel, the Brigade XO and I tried to incorporate all training under the S3.

The 5th Brigade always invited the U.S. advisors to command and staff meetings, and the commander has been open to our comments. Friction is bound to occur, but if problems are not surfaced, they will never be resolved.

During various portions of MIOAC, staff functions play a large part in practical exercises. When noted, the instructors point out the lack of staff coordination and make recommendations to correct this deficiency. The instructors explain the benefits of products that demonstrate proper staff coordination. Many MIOAC students have served as staff officers, but throughout the course, we learn that there are various ways to perform the same function with the same amount of coordination and planning.

One of the challenges was to remember that the ESAF just concluded a 12-year counterinsurgency, which didn't leave much time for planning. Even the time allotted for training was not always ideal.

Psychological Operations (PSYOP) and Civil Affairs (CA)

The advanced course covers both PSYOP and CA adequately. After studying various reports from the period between 1980 and 1992, one realizes the importance of PSYOP and CA. There are many aspects of PSYOP and CA we had to keep in mind:

☐ The overall PSYOP policy and program in a host country is established and coordinated at national level.

☐ In general, U.S. PSYOP should be in line with the host country's PSYOP program.

☐ Both the government and the insurgents use PSYOP in an effort to gain the support of the people.

☐ The primary PSYOP target groups are insurgents, civilian population, host country and allied forces, neutral elements, and external hostile powers.

In 5MZ, we did not track the number of deserters from both the military and the guerrilla force resulting from PSYOP programs. Indications confirmed that it was an effective method of operation for both sides.

Illustrated are several leaflets that both sides used to try to influence members of the other side to leave the ranks and join the opposition. The high rate of illiteracy in El Salvador becomes apparent when reading the propaganda leaflets, which contain many grammatical errors.

Here is an example of how IPB ties in with PSYOP. Because the Population and Enemy Situation Over-

lays were completed, propaganda was directed toward those groups operating in the area.

As a MIOAC student, I never thought that PSYOP and CA would play a role in my job as intelligence advisor. There were many diverse CA projects in 5MZ. As an advisor, ESAF commanders turned to me for both guidance and recommendations.

In El Salvador, I was involved in two CA projects, building a school in what used to be a guerrilla controlled area, and organizing a celebration in a small village outside San Vicente. The school will be built a kilometer from one of the former concentration areas that were formed when the Peace Accords were signed. U.S. Army personnel, ESAF engineers, soldiers, and locals will build the school.

As the senior intelligence advisor in 5MZ, I was responsible for U.S. Army personnel when they entered the zone. I also acted as liaison between U.S. forces and the ESAF. I was required to understand exactly what the mission was, and to make a threat analysis based on current intelligence.

My role was less significant in organizing the party. In the town of Achichilco, a kilometer south of San Vicente, the ESAF discovered a cache which had recently been uncovered. Weapons had been removed from the cache. The villagers turned over 21 rifles, including AK-47's and M-16's, and hundreds of rounds of rifle and mortar ammunition. As a show of gratitude, the 5th Brigade held a party for the village children with clowns and candy.

MIOAC effectively prepares officers to perform in Operations Other Than War, given the numerous and diverse scenarios we face worldwide.

Another CA project I participated in was the upcoming operation of an 11-year old boy who was injured during a guerrilla attack. When he was a seven-year-old, he was horseback riding when guerrillas blew up a tower supporting high voltage wires. The wires came down, killed the horse and maimed the boy. The military is funding the operations so the boy will have full use of both arms and be able to move his neck from side to side. It was the first time I had a firsthand experience with the consequences of this war.

Conclusion

Based on my experience in El Salvador, the MIOAC effectively prepares officers to perform in Operations Other Than War, given the numerous and diverse scenarios we face worldwide. One of the strongest points about MIOAC is that the instructors

¡¡¡¡ JOVEN ENGAÑADO POR EL FMLN/FDR
DEJA LASFILAS TERRORISTAS....

¡¡¡¡VUELVE A TU HOGAR, ESCAPA

TU FAMILIA TE ESPERA.....

are first rate and the team concept they use is extremely effective. Both the LIC branch and the Brigade and Division O&I branch did a great job in preparing the students to perform in an efficient, professional manner.

However, one recommendation would be to have a week's refresher at the end of the course based on the various assignments the students will have. Those students destined for overseas security assistance missions can benefit from additional orientations on the kind of challenges that await them. The Operations Other Than War department normally has personnel assigned who have served in these environments. Their experiences can be used to provide the others with tips and ideas on how to better serve in this capacity.

My tour in El Salvador opened my eyes to the challenges of Operations Other Than War. It is not an easy environment to operate in. It is unreasonable to expect the school to prepare us for all the problems we will face. MIOAC does a very effective job in giving MI officers the basics which allow us to survive.

CPT Smith is currently attending the CK-255 SIGINT Course at Fort Meade, MD. He was an intelligence advisor for an infantry brigade in El Salvador for seven months. While serving in the 1st Brigade in Germany, he acted as a French interpreter for combined exercises with French and German forces.

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DURING EL SALVADOR'S TRANSITION TO PEACE

by Captain Marcos R. Mendez

January 16, 1992, marked the end of 12 years of internal war in El Salvador. After two years of negotiations, the Government of El Salvador (GOES) and the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) signed Peace Accords.

The Peace Accords brought many changes to the El Salvador Armed Forces (ESAF). Throughout the conflict, this institution provided the umbrella that allowed the government to reform and rebuild its institutional base in support of the new Salvadoran democratic process.

During the war, the ESAF conducted intelligence operations in support of a national counterinsurgency plan. These intelligence operations were conducted against an enemy which constituted a direct "military" threat to the nation.

To support the combat forces, Salvadoran MI was developed as a new vehicle to better serve the ground commander. The most common intelligence disciplines—HUMINT, IMINT, and SIGINT—were employed, after the U.S. Army trained most of the ESAF's intelligence personnel. Their intelligence focus during the war very much paralleled our own system of conducting tactical intelligence operations in support of Operations Other Than War. Of course, for the ESAF it was not an Operation Other Than War, but a significant conflict. The survival of the nation was at stake.

Throughout the war years, the ESAF used various means to collect information. El Salvador's Security Forces—the Treasury Police, the National Guard, and the National Police—provided some of the best sources of intelligence. By virtue of their mission, they were deployed all over the country. ESAF soldiers were constantly on patrol. Both airborne collectors and ground-based stations provided SIGINT support. In addition, imagery from organic ESAF aircraft was extremely timely.

Defectors and other open-sources were supplied information as well. All of these systems were aimed at finding an elusive enemy and trying to predict what he would do next. By the end of the conflict,

all-source analysis and fusion had become a reality in El Salvador.

The ESAF and the GOES also created various specialized intelligence organizations to support the intelligence effort. They created an intelligence battalion—"Batallon de Inteligencia Militar" (BIM)—to better manage intelligence assets and the assignment of intelligence personnel to various infantry brigades. An intelligence school—the *ESNACIN*—became the center for MI officer basic and advanced course instruction. Additionally, ESNACIN conducted courses on interrogation and counterinsurgency to selected personnel.

An intelligence agency—"Direccion Nacional de Inteligencia (DNI)"—was created to provide national-level intelligence support. For the most part, the effort was extraordinarily complex.

The FMLN's war against the GOES/ESAF was fought on different fronts. The FMLN conducted a typical guerrilla war against the ESAF with a well-trained guerrilla army. Simultaneously, the FMLN conducted another war with their "invisible army" on the political front. They also managed a well orchestrated propaganda effort, both nationally and internationally, to undermine the government and the armed forces.

All of these efforts were well planned and executed with guidance from the communist governments of Cuba, (the former Sandinista) Nicaragua, Bulgaria, the former Soviet Union, and Vietnam.

The FMLN borrowed communist revolutionary doctrine to develop its ideas on insurgency and to organize the "revolution." Their guerrilla war strategy usually adhered to Mao Tse Tung's doctrine, although this focus often became an issue of debate among various FMLN factions. The Vietnamese influenced the FMLN the most in the adoption of political and propaganda models in line with Ho Chi Minh's philosophies. Soon they were able to adjust these precepts to the realities of El Salvador and adopted new concepts based on the Cuban and Nicaraguan experience.

Peace Accords

The Peace Accords challenged both the ESAF and the FMLN. The military's main responsibility was to concentrate all of its forces in its garrison areas or "cuarteles" and stay there through the Cease-Fire Agreement (CFA). The CFA was to last until October 31, 1992, although it was later rescheduled for December 15, 1992.

At the "cuarteles," the ESAF was restricted from conducting any type of training or military operations. Even moving forces from one place to another required prior notification and coordination with

ONUSAL (the U.N. Organization in El Salvador) All ESAF personnel movements required ONUSAL escort.

The FMLN, on the other hand, was required to concentrate its forces in 15 designated assembly zones (DAZs). Like the ESAF, the FMLN was obliged to coordinate all movement of forces with ONUSAL.

Additionally, the FMLN was required to turn in all weapons for destruction. One problem ONUSAL and the ESAF encountered in this area was developing a method to determine who, within the FMLN, was a guerrilla or simply a sympathizer. The CFA stated that all FMLN combatants were to be concentrated within the DAZs. However, FMLN leadership quickly made a distinction between combatants and sympathizers; most of the FMLN's leaders quickly became sympathizers. This gave the FMLN a flexibility that the GOES and the ESAF did not anticipate.

The Peace Accords called for the reduction of the ESAF and the elimination of the Security Forces. The ESAF had to reduce half of its forces, including the elimination of the five Immediate Reaction Infantry Battalions (BIRI).

The Treasury Police and the National Guard were immediately eliminated and the National Police was phased out. A newly formed security force—the "Policia Nacional Civil (PNC)"—began to receive training. The initial PNC force will have a representative percentage of FMLN and ex-security force personnel. The Peace Accords also dissolved the DNI.

The Salvadoran air force was forbidden to fly over any of the DAZs. During the war, the air force conducted flight coverage of the entire country with SIGINT platforms and imagery equipment. These flights were the primary source of imagery and a significant source of SIGINT intercepts. It was obvious that the main focus during the Peace Accords period was reorganization on a massive scale.

Intelligence Collection

The CFA called for the separation of ESAF and FMLN forces. Consequently, the restraints placed on ESAF movement hindered its intelligence collection capabilities. It took time for the ESAF to adjust to these new peacetime conditions. Adjusting was crucial because ESAF intelligence would eventually play a decisive role in the monitoring of FMLN compliance with the CFA.

During the war, rivers of information flowed into the ESAF. Now, the rivers were drying up. The elimination of the Security Forces and the concentration of the ESAF in the "cuarteles" took away most of the HUMINT. The restrictions imposed on the Salvadoran air force eliminated the low-level air-

borne SIGINT collection capabilities and all imagery collection.

During the CFA, the intelligence effort shifted more to counterintelligence. The FMLN was constantly trying to gather information, now that they were able to move freely within the country. The ESAF intelligence sections had no choice but to concentrate on countering this effort.

HUMINT soon became the only source of information because of the restrictions on the use of platforms. The only competition to HUMINT was from open-source information

In response to this information blackout, action was taken. It came in the form of priority intelligence requirements (PIR) from the "Estado Mayor Conjunto (EMC)." The EMC equates to our Joint Chiefs of Staff. The PIR that were developed a few months after the CFA was signed reflected the uncertainty prevailing in the armed forces.

PIR were aimed at FMLN combatants and their activities. This was not simply paranoia on the part of the ESAF. It is important to recognize that during the accords period, the ESAF was very concerned that the FMLN intended to build their logistic base.

EL PARTIDO
GUIONES
FMLN

Captured documents continued to refute the popular view that the FMLN sincerely desired peace. Consequently, the PIR focused on determining how many guerrillas were concentrated in the DAZs and what they were doing within the DAZs? (Training? Resupplying? Planning operations?)

Fortunately, the FMLN leadership concentrated their guerrilla army according to the CFA. However, the FMLN had other forces it did not concentrate in any of the DAZs—the strategic mobile forces, or special forces, as well as terrorist urban commandos

During negotiations, the FMLN chose to exclude the urban commandos from their demobilization primarily because they claimed they never existed. ESAF intelligence elements realized this and began to orchestrate collection efforts against this threat.

In addition to the strategic forces and the urban commandos, the political army remained very active. They organized rallies, meetings, propaganda, and various activities discrediting the GOES and the ESAF, even though they were not a legitimate political party when the CFA was signed. A year ago these people were in the ESAF's order of battle books. However, the rules on intelligence operations had changed.

With the signing of the Peace Accords in 1992, the conduct of intelligence operations against former FMLN members became a violation of the Salvadoran Constitution.

Conclusion

The CFA changed the entire battlefield and forced the ESAF MI to adjust to new realities. Eliminating the DNI and limiting the ESAF to the "cuarteles" disrupted the entire intelligence collection effort. CI became the priority and HUMINT assumed an even greater role.

During the period of the CFA, intelligence collection was a real challenge. Most of the information collected was rated B-2 (usually reliable source, probably true information). The intelligence effort was aimed at determining whether the FMLN was complying with the CFA, and trying to find any hidden agendas. However, time was short. Once the CFA was over and the Peace Accords signed, all intelligence operations directed against the civilian population or the FMLN as a legitimate political party ceased.

There are many lessons to be learned out of this conflict and its outcome. The U.S. Army supported the ESAF throughout this conflict and what we learned should be captured, analyzed, and kept in mind for future Operations Other Than War. I am sure there will be others!

Lessons from U.S. MI Training/Advisory in El Salvador

by Captain Victor J. Castrillo

The communist-backed insurgency in El Salvador ended January 16, 1992, with a negotiated settlement between the government and the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN). It is important to analyze the conflict. With the exception of the Vietnam Conflict, the U.S. Army intelligence community has obtained very few advisory lessons learned from counterinsurgency in Operations Other Than War. These lessons should be taken seriously, since, unlike Vietnam, El Salvador represents a positive experience in its final outcome.

The contributions of MI to the counterinsurgency effort in El Salvador are primarily intelligence training, analysis, and organization. On the other hand, the shortcomings deal with—

☐ The advisory assistance management system.

☐ The failure of senior advisors to manage the overall intelligence training effort.

☐ Lack of preparedness by many officers to function in security assistance office (SAO) missions.

Contributions

The most important contribution MI trainer/advisors made in El Salvador is training; especially, helping the El Salvadoran Armed Forces (ESAF) develop all-source production sections. Initially, teaching the basic fundamentals of tactical intelligence was key to the entire effort, since a new concept of intelligence needed to be developed and ingrained in the Salvadoran mind.

The tactical intelligence concept was important. Before U.S. advisory involvement, the ESAF's concept of intelligence was maintaining files and bulletins. Files and bulletins were maintained on Communist Party members who had been operating clandestinely since the 1932 communist uprising.

The responsibility for maintaining personality files and conducting background investigations on these

> We in the S2 section worked with a map found in a garbage can when we realized that we had a war on our hands.

people rested with the Public Security Forces which were subordinate to the Ministry of Defense. Their intelligence organizations were limited to archives, interrogations, surveillance, and investigations.

In the ESAF, tactical intelligence was nonexistent. The infantry brigade was the highest tactical maneuver element; it had, by TO&E, only one individual assigned to its intelligence staff section. Usually, the officer assigned to this job lacked any intelligence training and experience. For example, an officer in the cavalry regiment S2 section confided that when the conflict started in 1980, it caught the ESAF unprepared. "We in the S2 section worked with a map found in a garbage can when we realized

that we had a war on our hands."

Another officer said, "At the beginning of the conflict we had no idea what tactical intelligence was all about and our learning was done empirically It was so bad that if you were caught reading a revolutionary book to learn more about the enemy, you were branded a communist "

Interrogation principles and techniques were another aspect of training that needed a major overhaul. We were dealing with an army that during the

early years did not understand the use of interrogating prisoners. They were considered to be a burden and not a potential source of information to the ESAF. The advisors pointed out three good reasons for the proper interrogation of prisoners:

- [ ] To gain three basic, but previously lacking intelligence requirements: information about the enemy's disposition, capabilities, and intentions.
- [ ] To improve ESAF's human rights record. This is a prerequisite for continued U.S. military aid.
- [ ] To create conditions that would encourage guerrillas to desert or surrender when they were in a desperate situation.

The intelligence cycle was the foundation for teaching the principles of intelligence. Once we taught the intelligence cycle and order of battle, we introduced Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) as a way to capture the intelligence estimate in graphic form.

The Salvadorans adopted our IPB doctrine, but modified some of the overlays to meet their own bat-

tlefield requirements. Although lacking doctrinal templates to represent threat models, they developed a series of overlays based on a Vietnam version of this concept model These threat overlays were developed by an MI advisor/trainer and an ESAF intelligence officer in 1988, and were renamed the "Tri-Zonal Concept" in 1989. As an IPB concept, this idea is worth discussing.

The Tri-Zonal Concept

The Tri-Zonal Concept is a way of dividing the country into geographic areas based on the type of insurgent activity. This concept divides an insurgency into three natural and sequential stages of development: the Area of Control or Persistence, the Area of Expansion, and the Area of Influence.

The Area of Control or Persistence is where the insurgents predominate politically and militarily. The Area of Control or Persistence is characterized by—

- [ ] Command, control, and communications.
- [ ] Logistics.
- [ ] Hospitals.
- [ ] Training bases.
- [ ] A political and a military infrastructure—a form of government with new administrative procedures, organization, and taxes.

The Area of Expansion is that area where the enemy is relatively weak, but is trying to sow the seeds of revolution. In this area, the enemy operates clandestinely in small cells. The Area of Expansion is characterized by—

- [ ] Sabotage.
- [ ] Assassination.
- [ ] Kidnapping.
- [ ] Threats.
- [ ] Propaganda.
- [ ] Violence directed against the establishment (government and military).

The Area of Influence is that area where the insurgents have developed a social base (whether large or small) and compete with the government for legitimacy. It is characterized by—

- [ ] Attempts to convert the population.
- [ ] Clandestine and public meetings.
- [ ] Demonstrations.
- [ ] All or some of the characteristics of the Area of Expansion.

The technique of classifying zones or areas by type of enemy activity helps the S2 interpret what is happening in his area of operations and conduct predictive analysis in terms of the enemy's modus operandi, size, and capability. Once integrated into the fifth step of the IPB process, this threat model allows the S2 to develop an event template to interdict the enemy—through military, civic, psychological, or

a combination of these actions.

Intelligence Analysis

Another area MI trainer/advisors got involved in was intelligence analysis. The impact that these trainers made in their units was critical. For example, in 1988, a U.S. military trainer was working closely with his Salvadoran counterpart in the Naval Intelligence Service. He developed an indicators list to monitor insurgent seaborne logistic operations that took place before, during, and after supplies were delivered on the coast.

This was a significant contribution. Before the indicators, Salvadoran analysts were interpreting the three phases of delivery as three distinct deliveries instead of just one delivery marked by three phases.

All-source analysis was another major achievement, but one that developed slowly due to the complex nature of this effort. It was necessary to create an entire new system or infrastructure. The all-source analysis sections, otherwise known as Regional Intelligence Centers (RICs), did not become a reality until 1986 — six years after the war started.

The RIC concept was developed by a U.S. civilian advisor and a Salvadoran officer. The organization of the RIC was instrumental in fusing multidiscipline information and turning it into intelligence. The RIC is organized into three main areas:

☐ Military subversion order of battle.
☐ Non-military subversion order of battle.
☐ Document analysis.

The military subversion order of battle section focused on all IEW tasks, except for counterintelligence (CI) which the CI section handled. The non-military subversion order of battle section analyzed the political and social aspects of the war. The document analysis section supported both the military order of battle section and the non-military section through document exploitation. The RIC was to prove its worth as a highly effective way to organize an S2 section in any host-nation facing an insurgency.

The DIA's Central American Joint Intelligence Team (CAJIT) also played an important role. The Salvadorans viewed CAJIT members as intelligence advisors. CAJIT was a catalyst in starting the RIC. They provided a data base, analytical products, and report formats, and showed how they arrived at their conclusions.

As the Salvadorans became more confident in their own analysts, they relied less and less on CAJIT. By the time the cease-fire was signed on January 16, 1992, the CAJIT had practically worked itself out of a job.

Shortcomings

In my opinion, there are four fundamental problems with the advisory effort:

☐ Lack of continuity and overlap among advisors.
☐ Doctrinal contradictions among advisors.
☐ Lack of depth in training goals.
☐ Lack of a long-term plan to manage the overall effort.

The lack of continuity and overlap among advisors hindered the overall training/advisory effort. In most cases, when the outgoing trainer departed, the inbound trainer was ill-equipped in the following areas:

☐ Deployment experience in Latin America.
☐ Knowledge of the political situation.
☐ Knowledge of the history of the country and the conflict.
☐ In some cases, language qualifications.

It would usually take from three to six months for a new advisor to adequately familiarize himself with the enemy situation and the history of the conflict. Consequently, the MI trainer/advisors functioned in a limited capacity 3 to 6 months of a 12-month tour.

Doctrinal contradictions among MI trainer/advisors sometimes created problems. Some argued that the conventional model of analysis, IPB, and the collection plan could be applied without any changes. Others argued that the conventional model served only as a guide, not as a blueprint, because the analysis of the enemy situation in Operations Other Than War varied. It was very confusing for the Salvadorans when trainers contradicted each other.

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Lack of depth in training goals was another drawback. Early in the conflict, introductory courses were sufficient because the Salvadorans were starting from zero. As they matured through wartime experiences and basic advisory training, they began to demand more sophisticated techniques. This was often beyond the capability of the trainer/advisors, but was expected of them.

Not every MI trainer/advisor was able to adapt a U.S. conventional model to a counterinsurgency model, at least in its application. Most did fine as long as they were teaching theory. This is not to say that every trainer did not adjust, because some MI trainer/advisors did adjust and contribute to the war effort.

Lack of a long-term vision or plan to manage the overall effort also presented its own set of problems. Because there was a lack of guidance from senior advisors who managed the program, units were not taught the same subjects or tasks under the same conditions and standards. MI trainer/advisors in the field had their own agendas. Some of the trainer/advisors stressed training while others stressed analysis.

Training was not guided by the Battalion Training Management Systems (BTMS), and later by FM 25-100, Training the Force. Consequently, except for basic intelligence principles, trainer/advisors were never able to infuse training doctrine into the ESAF system.

CI was an area where the trainers had the least influence. All during the war, the training program lacked CI trainers. Only two CI trainer/advisors served in El Salvador during the entire conflict.

All MI trainer/advisors—whether 35G, 35D, or 35E—unwittingly accepted the Venezuelan CI doctrine dating from the beginning of the war.

This doctrine consisted of three areas of security: physical, personnel, and communication security. Through the influence of the trainers, it was later expanded to include document and operational security. However, this concept fell short of our own CI doctrine which assumes both passive and active roles in detecting and neutralizing enemy intelligence organizations.

The Salvadorans never developed an offensive CI operational capability to penetrate and neutralize hostile intelligence organizations. Their understanding of CI was strictly defensive, just as their doctrine implied. They were not able to institutionalize a SAEDA program, although some trainer/advisors used their initiative and taught SAEDA in their brigades.

Another area we failed to develop was low-level human intelligence (HUMINT). Many trainers had to

teach this technique without any experience or formal training because most U.S. civilian advisors would not get involved in training. Nevertheless, the trainer/advisors had to teach HUMINT, since much of the intelligence was obtained through low-level HUMINT operations. Trainer/advisors were forced to learn from text books.

There were many problems with the Salvadoran case officers which are beyond the scope of this article. Suffice it to say that, for the most part, their modus operandi were without methodology.

Lessons Learned

We succeeded in El Salvador. However, we discovered weaknesses and learned where we need to improve. These are some of the most obvious flaws:

1. Fundamentals. It is imperative, when dealing with a host nation with an insurgency, that we first teach the fundamentals and principles of intelligence. This must be done in order to change preconceived ideas of what intelligence is, especially in emerging democracies in Third World countries.

2. Interrogation. Trainer/advisors must teach the principles and techniques of interrogation, since the benefits of good interrogation outweigh the results of less desirable techniques.

3. Unconventional models. Although the IPB methodology works in Operations Other Than War, the application of IPB may vary. The MI trainer/advisor must be able to create unconventional models or templates based on pattern analysis, behavior, organization, and modus operandi.

4. All-source analysis centers. MI trainer/advisors in Third World countries may have to put together all-source analysis centers, or RICs. As you do this, remember that every analysis section will have its own peculiarities that make it effective in the host-nation. Not every conflict is the same, nor are the people or the culture.

5. Order of battle. The concept of creating a non-military subversion order of battle cell should be more carefully studied by the Intelligence Center in Operations Other Than War. Organizations like CAJIT, which function as catalysts, are invaluable in helping Third World countries develop their own all-source analysis capability.

6. Special Operations Command. The creation of the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) provides a challenge for the Intelligence Center to better prepare MI officers to support the types of missions requiring USSOCOM involvement. I also recommend that those officers scheduled to serve in Security Assistance Office (SAO) positions attend a special course on unconventional warfare at an advanced level beyond the overviews offered

by Fort Huachuca and Fort Bragg. This will ensure that MI officers are introduced to the writings of revolutionary leaders and read counterinsurgency case studies.

7. Counterintelligence. Senior intelligence advisors assigned to SAOs should take a more active role in creating doctrine and standardizing lesson plans in the field to avoid contradictions among trainers. Top priority must be given to CI in SAO missions. In El Salvador, only one billet was allocated to CI during the entire period; in a scenario where enemy HUMINT *predominated.*

8. HUMINT. The Intelligence Center should put more emphasis on tactical-level HUMINT, since U.S. military trainers are often asked to provide training to host-nation personnel. It is also an area where MI officers may have to get more involved in future U.S. deployments in Operations Other Than War. It happened to me during Operation Just Cause!

Conclusion

If the new world order translates into regional conflicts, the intelligence community must devote a proportionate amount of time and effort to intelligence analysis as it relates to Operations Other Than War. There must be a balance between the amount of time devoted to Operations Other Than War and conventional IPB and analysis.

Today, with the integration of new ideas in the development of **FM 34-7, IEW Support to Low Intensity Conflict,** we are closing the gap created by years of overemphasis on conventional European scenarios. This is a positive step which will improve our capability to meet tomorrow's challenges.

CPT Castrillo is currently attending the Command and General Staff College. He served two tours in El Salvador. As an MI trainer/advisor, he was a member of a tactical intelligence mobile training team, the CI trainer/advisor, and later, the deputy intelligence advisor for U.S. Military Group

NATIONAL CRYPTOLOGIC SCHOOL-SPONSORED LANGUAGE PROGRAMS

The NCS recently funded two language programs: the Summer Language Program (SLANG), and the Yonsei University Korean Language Program.

SLANG will provide eligible linguists the chance to enhance their language skills at a full-time, intensive collegiate language program. Selectees receive funding to defray tuition, books, travel, and room and board.

Applicants must: 1. Be a 98G, 98CL, 352G, or 352C with two years' on-the-job experience in the MOS; 2. Currently work in the language they are applying for; 3. Score at least 2/2 in the language on the Defense Language Proficiency Test (DLPT) within a year on February 22, 1994 — this requirement is not waiverable; 4. Meet remaining time in service obligation following SLANG, IAW AR 614-200, paragraph 4-6; 5. Submit application through the chain-of-command and address it to your MACOM Language Program Management Office. Applications must reach HQDA and PERSCOM NLT February 22, 1994.

Applicants (or their language training staffs) must ask the schools to provide information on program availability, application procedures, tuition costs. Recommend applicants submit proposals for low cost, sound programs. Applications are considered on a cost comparison basis; therefore, applicants should consider local colleges/universities. Installation travel clerks must verify the total cost of each proposal.

SLANG reference: DAMI-PIT MSG DTD, 191628Z NOV 93; SUBJECT: SUMMER LANGUAGE PROGRAM (SLANG), FY94, MSG #A933230374.

Yonsei University Korean Language Program

This program is available to eligible Korean linguists. This is a one-year course at Yonsei University, Seoul, Korea. Linguists will be able to enhance their language skills and learn about Korean culture.

Applicants must: 1. Be an active duty 98G, 98CL, 352G, or 352C (Korean) with two years' on-the-job experience in the MOS; 2. Have the potential to be or currently in a position requiring advanced Korean language skills; 3. Have scored at least 2/2 on the Korean DLPT, or passed the NSA Korean Language Proficiency Test (LPT) and Language Transcription Test (LTT) within a year of March 18, 1994; 4. Be eligible for PCS if in CONUS; 5. Acknowledge in writing a 30-month remaining service obligation following the training IAW AR 614-200, paragraph 4-6; 6. Acknowledge in their application that they will serve one year in the 501st MI BDE (Korea) following the training. Submit your application through your chain-of-command to your MACOM Language Program Management Office. Applications must reach HQDA and PERSCOM NLT March 18, 1994.

For more information, contact your unit language training staff or MACOM Language Program Manager.

Yonsei University Korean Language Program reference: DAMI-PIT MSG DTD, 241650Z NOV 93; SUBJECT: YONSEI UNIVERSITY LANGUAGE PROGRAM, FY94, MSG #A933280433.

ALWAYS OUT FRONT

Military Intelligence Corps Hall of Fame

Colonel Harry K. Fukuhara

In July 1993, Colonel (Retired) Harry K. Fukuhara was inducted as a Distinguished Member of the MI Corps (DMOC). He is the 21st Hall of Fame member selected for DMOC status as a living ambassador for the MI Corps.

Colonel Fukuhara was born in Seattle, and moved to Hiroshima, where he attended high school during the four years before World War II. After completing high school, he attended college in California.

Colonel Fukuhara enlisted in the U.S. Army in 1942 after being released from an American-Japanese Internment Camp in Arizona. He volunteered to be a linguist, and was sent to Japanese Language Studies at the MI Service Language School, Camp Savage, MN. Fukuhara became one of 3,000 American-born Japanese to serve in the Pacific Theater of the war.

As a sergeant, Fukuhara became the leader of a 10-man interrogator-interpreter team. He taught the military commanders the value of capturing Japanese soldiers for interrogation. These soldiers were trained to "fight to the end"; however, they were not well trained in resisting interrogation. His team acquired extensive intelligence from these prisoners of war. Because of Fukuhara's contributions to the war effort, he received the Bronze Star Medal. Later, in the New Guinea and Philippine campaigns, he earned a battlefield commission.

In 1945, Colonel Fukuhara was informed that he would participate in the proposed invasion of Kyushu. If the invasion had taken place, he may have fought against two of his own brothers, Frank and Pierce, who had been drafted into the Japanese Army. Instead, he landed with the occupation force

after the bombing of Hiroshima, his family's home city. He found his mother and another brother, Victor, suffering from the effects of radiation. Victor died a few months later but his mother survived another 20 years.

After World War II, Colonel Fukuhara initially served as an interpreter/translator during the occupation of Japan. After returning to the United

States, he attended the Counterintelligence (CI) Course at Camp Holabird, MD. He then became the operations officer and commander of the CI Field Office, Osaka, Japan, until 1952. After an intelligence assignment in San Francisco, he returned to Japan as the Chief, CI Investigative and Liaison Detachment Tokyo, from 1959 to 1964. From 1964 to 1966, he was the Deputy Commander of the 109th Intelligence Corps Group, Fort Meade, MD. He returned again to Japan to command the CI and Collection Detachment in Tokyo from 1966 to 1970, and was subsequently awarded the Legion of Merit. During this time, he successfully conducted a number of highly sensitive intelligence operations.

Colonel Fukuhara supported the war in Vietnam and was a key figure in the Japan-based collection element. The information he acquired aided national policy makers in assessing the warmaking potential and military objectives of the North Vietnamese Army and the Viet Cong.

Colonel Fukuhara served as Military Governor of the Yaeyama Islands Group of the Ryukyu Island Chain from 1970 to 1971. The Yaeyama Islands were still devastated from World War II. He was instrumental in rebuilding the Islands' infrastructure and improving the quality of life and morale of his constituents. In doing so, he contributed to better United States-Japanese bilateral relations during the critical period when the territory reverted from United States to Japanese control. He completed many long-standing projects, made progress in many new projects, and significantly improved Ryukyuan-American relations.

Colonel Fukuhara retired from active duty in 1971, but remained active in the MI Civilian Excepted Career Program. From 1972 until his retirement in 1991, he was the Liaison to Japan, fostering American-Japanese cooperation through his extensive personal contacts, and played a key role in the negotiation of several bilateral agreements.

Colonel Fukuhara believed the most important lesson he learned during his years in Japan was understanding "Jin-myaka." "Jin" means person and "myakie" means vein. The nearest English translation would be "personal connections." He said that the success of human intelligence (HUMINT) is knowing the true meaning of "Jin-myaka" with all its intricacies, because personal connections are basic to HUMINT.

When he retired from Federal Service in 1991, Colonel Fukuhara was presented the Distinguished Federal Civilian Service Medal by the President of the United States. As a Distinguished Member of the MI Corps, Colonel Fukuhara will be an outstanding spokesman and advocate for Military Intelligence.

MI Corps Hall of Fame Nominations

The Office of the Chief of Military Intelligence (OCMI) accepts nominations for the Military Intelligence Hall of Fame throughout the year. Anyone can nominate an individual for induction into the MI Hall of Fame. Eligible for nomination are commissioned officers, warrant officers, enlisted soldiers, or civilians who have served in a U.S. Army intelligence unit or in an intelligence position in the U.S. Army.

A nominee must have made a significant contribution to MI which reflects favorably on the MI Corps. In certain isolated instances (particularly in the case of junior soldiers), the nomination may be based on heroic actions and valorous awards rather than other documented contributions.

Nominees cannot be employed by the U.S. Government in any capacity at the time of their nomination. Individuals cannot be self-nominated. An annual Hall of Fame Board convenes to review nominations and to make recommendations to the Chief of Military Intelligence. However, the Chief of Military Intelligence is the final approving authority for inductions into the Hall of Fame.

The OCMI provides information on nomination procedures. If you wish to nominate someone, contact OCMI, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca, ATTN: ATZS-MI (Mr. Chambers), Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000; or call DSN 821-1180 or Commercial (602) 533-1180.

subject important enough to write a response.

I strongly dispute MAJ Womack's claim that MIPB added to the "fog of doctrinal applications" and caused "misunderstanding of the intelligence process" by printing LTC Wenger's "doctrinally incorrect" article. It is clear from MAJ Womack's letter that he has no concept of what happened during the LA riots. He appears totally uninformed on how the CA-ARNG was tasked and the type of missions we were allowed to perform by civilian authorities. MAJ Womack seems also to be ignorant of a few laws and regulations that greatly affect and limit what the military (even the National Guard) can do in Civil Disturbance (CD) operations.

MAJ Womack claims that an MCOO "could and should have been done for this operation." Besides the CA-ARNG, no one with the J2 of the JTF, 1MEF, or the 7ID units produced MCOOs. I totally fail to understand the value of an MCOO in this situation. I totally fail to understand how one could be produced or used. Would not every one of the tens of thousands of streets be high speed avenues of approach or mobility corridors?

On an LA MCOO, would houses and buildings be SLOW GO or NO GO? Would 10-lane freeways be SLOW GO or NO GO during the commuting hours and high speed at night? Realistically, everywhere was "a GO area," as LTC Wenger stated. Instead of an MCOO, the JTF and 4OID(M) made extensive use of donated AAA street maps and purchased Thomas Guides (a combined street map/index), which show every street in the LA basin.

MAJ Womack is the first and only person I know of who has suggested an MCOO would have had some use. If MAJ Womack can produce such an MCOO for the area within the entire LA

basin, the 4OID(M) and the CA-ARNG would be grateful, if it is useful/readable.

MAJ Womack further states that the failure to produce an MCOO "demonstrates a lack of understanding as to what was needed to support the decision-making process and a lack of experience in the use of the analysis required in the IPB process." MAJ Womack states that all involved in this operation did not understand "the thought processes involved in developing" event templates, doctrinal templates, decision support templates, or a synchronization matrix. LTC Wenger, like all of the military in the operation, was not part of the tactical decision-making process. The CA-ARNG was not allowed to organize and conduct independent operations, even when federalized and under joint task force control. In very simple terms, the civilian authorities directed the military where to go and what to do when they got there.

The vast majority of the CA-ARNG's missions were to secure/guard/protect sites from further destruction from ordinary civilians and gangs. Other missions were to provide escorts or deploy as reaction forces around the many cities. LTC Wenger sent his soldiers as ordered by, in the quantity specified by, and to the location specified by the civilian authorities, usually under direct police guidance/escort. If LTC Wenger received information that the "enemy" was overrunning the supermarket a mile from one of his units, his only option was to report that information. It was the civilian decision makers who determined what kind of force, if any, to send in response.

Further, the so-called "enemy" demonstrated no doctrine, no doctrinal/standard formations, and no operational patterns. There was no history nor any doctrinal templates. The "enemy" attacked targets from LA to San Bernadino and Long Beach to Pasadena.

Who was the "enemy"? It was

not just the gangs, as all citizens of the area were well represented within the "enemy." As with the MCOO, I would also appreciate MAJ Womack's assistance in developing some doctrinal templates covering random looter-offensive formations, gang units in the offense, gang units in the defense, or civilian store owners in the defense.

Many of MAJ Womack's comments directly imply the need for detailed data on gangs or civilians. He states that "all units...need to have a data bank on riots" and "...indicators that can be collected on to provide early warning...." I fully agree with him that this would be helpful to all, as many of the civilian organizations need great improvement in data fusion. The G2 section of the 4OID(M) could collect and correlate regular gang and other data dumps from the various law enforcement agencies in the LA area. To further enhance our threat data, we could task our CEWI battalion, request corps/EAC support and other agencies to collect data on the "threat."

However, I believe there is at least one Executive Order and numerous regulations, produced by the Army (AR 380-13 and AR 381-10) and NSA, that severely limit the military from intelligence work against U.S. citizens in the U.S., and from keeping information on them. In fact, it is highly unlikely that we could ever get the required specific approval from the appropriate authorities to legally start intelligence operations in LA.

During the trial of the LAPD officers, many 4OID(M) personnel would have liked to work on a "data bank" or collect indicators "to provide early warning" for the potential riot many predicted if the officers were acquitted. However, we obeyed the law. Further, during demobilization, almost everything generated was required to be destroyed in accordance with regulation and under the unsolicited supervision of

DOD personnel.

LTC Wenger's S2 NCOIC is a California Highway Patrol Officer, one of many police officers in the CA-ARNG with access to many sources of "threat" data. However, he knows he cannot use that information legally while wearing his BDUs. I don't know if MAJ Womack is an MI officer, but it seems difficult to understand how someone could be in the MI Branch long enough to make major without being sensitive to the laws about collection against U.S. citizens.

MAJ Womack criticizes the 3/160(M)'s INTSUM #3 for its lack of analysis. What real/useful analysis is possible? "Violence continues to remain well below normal due to the CA-ARNG presence and limited surviving targets. Drug sales, murders, and drive-by shootings are all well below LA averages. Sporadic violence continues and will start to return to normal as CA-ARNG troops pull out." Anyone watching CNN could say that.

In addition, the INTSUMs produced by the 3/160(M) and 40ID(M) were directed **not** to include conclusions. The civilian authorities did not want multiple agencies issuing independent and possible conflicting assessments. If written conclusions and predictions were released that differed from the governor's or the mayor's statements, one could assume there would be some fallout and the generation of unnecessary confusion for the public.

MAJ Womack's claim that the PIR of the 3/160(M) "show a lack of knowledge about how to determine what intelligence is critical to the mission...." In fact, MAJ Womack totally lacks any knowledge of the state-produced California National Guard CD Handbook, which uses the term "PIR" for the specific kind of information expressed by 3/160(M). The 3/160(M) S2 correctly passed the requirements of his higher civilian authorities down to his subordinate units. Based on our mission and our limitations,

doctrinal PIR did not have any purpose here.

MAJ Womack's suggestion of "Where and when will specific gangs attack?" for a PIR is far worse and far more vague. It reminds one of the typical "Where and when will the enemy launch its main attack?" that every BCTP evaluator, I've been exposed to, gives as an example of useless PIR.

MAJ Womack is probably correct that HVT was used incorrectly in the article and during the riots. In working with the civilians many adjustments in terminology had to be made. Potential enemy targets or objectives may be a more doctrinally correct term. However, high value target was more clear to the civilians/police and less likely to cause fallout from referring to civilians as the "enemy."

The objective of IPB should be to inform the commander/staff and/or paint an accurate picture of the battlefield to help him plan and fight. All too frequently, IPB is viewed as either a legal contract or checklist that is overly product oriented. Too many MI types believe when they have produced all the products, they are done.

LTC Wenger and 1LT Young provided useful insight into their real-world CD operations. This is an area not well addressed in current doctrine for intelligence operations and IPB. It is clear that the Active Component and the MI Branch need to get involved with the conceptual planning, training, and doctrine for CD intelligence and tactical operations within the legal guidelines. The rapid commitment of 7ID and 1 MEF elements under a JTF to LA demonstrates that this is not and should not be just a National Guard training issue.

(The following is provided to show both my background and my personal knowledge of LTC Wenger's performance and qualifications. While I have no idea of MAJ Womack's practical IPB knowledge, LTC Wenger, in

previous assignments as the Deputy Division G2 and CEWI Battalion S3, demonstrated to many an excellent understanding of the IPB process during two WAR-FIGHTER Exercises. I had firsthand exposure to the performance of LTC Wenger's 3/160 Infantry Battalion (M) during the LA riots. The 3/160 (M) was the first tactical battalion called and the last to leave 30 days later LTC Wenger's soldiers were deployed in company/platoon size elements over a 60-mile radius from his armory. It took 15 hours just to visit all of the deployment sites. At the 40ID(M) G2, I was able to read through most of their reports and at least 45 to 50 of their INTSUMs. I also conducted a personal inspection of LTC Wenger's unit during the riots. The product received from 3/160(M) was superior to all others, including 7ID and USMC battalions.

I have been in the intelligence business for 17 years with Active/Reserve/National Guard Army, NSA, DOD contractors, and the Navy. My full-time job is with EW Systems Engineering and Threat Analysis for EW Avionics Systems with the Information and Electronic Warfare Directorate at NAWCWPNS, China Lake. Part-time during the last four years, including the LA riots, I have been with the 401D(M) G2 section as the CM&D chief and ASIC chief. I am qualified both as a 35D and 35G. I graduated from Norwich University in 1976. Since then, I have held a wide variety of positions at various locations with several being non-intelligence, including scout infantry platoon leader [straight-leg].)

Peter Gardner
Information and Electronic Warfare Directorate, NAWCWPNS China Lake, CA

ATTENTION READERS
MIPB has a new FAX number. You can now send material to (602)533-6308 or DSN 821-6308.

Prep School Offers a "Competitive Edge"

by Sergeant Jim Blazevic

Military cuts. That's all we seem to hear lately. As government, business, and the military streamline and reorganize to meet the challenges of a rapidly changing world situation, future leaders must be more innovative and more flexible than ever before. In short, they need a "competitive edge."

With the current economic situation calling for deeper and deeper cuts, where will the opportunities for military training and education lie? Training is critical if we are to meet the demands of a new strategy that envisions the U.S. dealing with multiple regional threats.

Whether you're a company commander, a platoon sergeant, or a squad leader, training the troops and providing opportunities for quality soldiers are leadership challenges that will become even more critical as the budget tightens. However, a smaller force isn't all bad. Today's leaders still have a direct influence over the Army's future leaders.

Soldiers chosen to attend the United States Military Academy Preparation School (USMAPS) at Fort Monmouth, NJ, come from all over the world, from different backgrounds, from units just like yours. After 10 months of rigorous academic, military, and athletic training, about half of those soldiers earn appointments to the Military Academy at West Point, NY. Undoubtedly, all carry a deep appreciation for those leaders who laid the foundation for the Prep School.

Of the 300 students who began the USMAPS class of 1994 in July, 160 were Regular Army soldiers The Prep School curriculum is designed to prepare them for appointments to and success at the Military Academy.

Primary emphasis is on academics (English and math), mixed with military training, physical conditioning, and the development of leadership traits and ethics. While the main focus is on preparation for passing the entrance exams for West Point, the course is also designed to prepare students to meet the rigors of cadet life. Students gain valuable leadership experience serving in the student chain of command, participating in 1 of 16 varsity sports or intramurals, conducting peer evaluations, training in military drill, and a variety of other experiences that follow the model that cadets undergo at West Point.

The Prep School is not just some abstract concept. Since 1916, USMAPS has provided a stepping stone to West Point for thousands of enlisted men and women. Its distinguished lineage of graduates includes 64 general officers, Rhodes Scholars, and decorated veterans of four wars.

In terms of education, it is a "chance of a lifetime," comparable to Officer Candidate School, Warrant Officer Candidate School, and the Green-to-Gold Program, but without any previous college-work requirements.

Training the Army's enlisted people to become West Point cadets and future officers, the Prep School route provides the Army with a pool of experienced soldiers as leaders. The only way many of the enlisted soldiers can survive at West Point is if they have the one extra year of preparation at USMAPS. The majority of soldiers learn about the program through their unit leaders.

If you know of a quality young soldier, 17 through 21 years of age, make sure he or she knows about this opportunity. A unit leader who recognizes special traits in a soldier and then acts to assure that the soldier competes for admission to USMAPS leaves a valuable legacy—one that benefits both the soldier and the nation's future force structure

To be eligible for USMAPS, a soldier must be a U.S. citizen or become one before entering the Military Academy; single with no legal obligation to support a child or children; a high school graduate or GED equivalent; medically qualified for admission to the Military Academy, with vision correctable to 20/20 with glasses; and of high moral character, with no military or felony conviction or history of drug or alcohol abuse.

For more information, write to the Commandant, USMAPS, Fort Monmouth, NJ 07703; or phone DSN 992-1807/1808 or Commercial (908) 532-1807/1808.

SGT Blazevic is the Public Affairs Officer at the USMAPS. He is a graduate of Indiana University and will soon earn his MBA.

TOTAL FORCE

by Colonel Joseph T. Mesch

Divisional Update

The MI Proponent is in the forefront of redesigning our Reserve Component (RC) MI troop units. We are on track in the restructure of our divisional MI battalions. Converting our existing MI battalions to the new "A" series and then making them Expansible simply means that these units get smaller by about 65 language-dependent slots. Coordinating with HQDA and especially the Guard Bureau, we hope to activate these new Expansible Units in Compo 2 as they become smaller and more ready. The 65 MI language-dependent slots remain in the Army Reserve and are ethnically stationed in modular teams. This win-win situation benefits all components and helps MI soldiers do their job preparing for mobilization.

Our next step is to fix our RC MI units in an Echelons Above Division (EAD) status. MI Proponent is using the principles that MI ReLook developed and coordinated for success.

AC Requirements. Clearly, it does no good to have an elaborate force structure in the RC, if there is no tie to an Active Component (AC) mobilization mission. The RC exists by tradition, legislation, and design to augment the regular force in time of war. Therefore, we must design a force that satisfies AC wartime requirements. HQDA has garnered these requirements from the field, and they are our basic mission.

Leverage RC Strengths. We must emphasize the positive strengths of our citizen-soldiers in designing our units. Forcing a mirror-image unit structure with the AC does not work. Using synergism of military and civilian skills not only makes sense but is also cost effective, especially in the early periods of mobilization.

Minimize Equipment. Equipment, especially IEW equipment, is both expensive to acquire and difficult to maintain. Since not all AC units are getting the new equipment, RC MI units are programmed for vintage hand-me downs. If we use automation, however, and the right connectivity from the AC to our Regional Training Sites, we are more effective in training soldiers and at less cost.

Modular Teams. Our existing RC MI force structure assumed units deploying to a massive land war in Europe against the "Evil Empire." Now we are planning regional contingencies that call for smaller, ready, and quick-responding teams of forces. We must design our units with functional teams such as interrogators fluent in Arabic. When our nation mobilizes, these teams augment the AC with the use of a derivative unit identification code (UIC) versus calling the whole unit. We will redesign our units to be composed of such modular teams.

Maintain RC MI Units. No, this is not a contradiction. The RC is not just individual fillers. A command and control structure is needed for both peacetime command and to allow upward mobility. If we do not have an MI life cycle, soldiers simply will not stay in the system. We need RC MI brigades and battalions to develop MI sergeants major and command sergeants major plus lieutenant colonels and colonels. How else can we develop our future general officers (GOs)?

RC MI Force Design Update

Using these principles, the MI Proponent is undertaking a complete redesign or FDU of all our RC MI EAD units. We intend to use the normal in-cycle update. We are working closely with Army Reserve and National Guard and INSCOM.

We are addressing this significant issue as part of the FDU. We are working in close coordination with the Army Reserve Command to ensure there is complete cooperation. We have a target of opportunity here that allows us to be in the forefront of the changing ARCOM structure into functional commands. There is incredible potential to develop a GO MI Command using our existing MI brigade structure along with a converted ARCOM. Much more to come on this.

DCSINT USARC

We offer our best wishes and cooperation to the new DCSINT of the US Army Reserve Command in Atlanta. Colonel Mark Fauk recently assumed this challenging position. Toll free telephone number for the DCSINT is 1-800-359-8836, extension 7902.

Colonel Joe Mesch is the Chief of the Reserve Forces Office at U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca. He is available at DSN 821-1176/1177, or at home (602) 459-6893. FAX DSN is 821-1762.

VANTAGE POINT

dynamics coordinated with the battle labs. We are taking the Louisiana Maneuvers (LAM) process and embedding it into the Battle Focus Center's method of operation.

The Center will be the hub for IEW integration. The Battle Focus Center will harness the power of the U.S. Army Intelligence Center, INSCOM, the entire MI Corps, and the great synergy resident at Fort Huachuca, with the collocation of Information Systems Command, Electronic Proving Ground, IEW Test Facility, and the Joint Interoperability Test Center to move IEW into the future. The Center also will work with Program Executive Offices to ensure cross-walk of technology and requirements to field the best possible capabilities.

The future is here now and the Battle Focus Center is MI's means of making TRADOC the Army's architect for change in IEW.

PROPONENT NOTES

ALWAYS OUT FRONT

Enlisted Notes

CMF 98 Restructure. It has been several months since we updated our readers on our Career Management Field (CMF) 98 restructure efforts. This is due to the move of the CMF 98 Restructure Task Force to Fort Huachuca, completed in August 1993, and a change in task force leadership. The Intelligence Center will once again publish regular update messages, now that the task force is firmly in place .

We held our first meeting with the relocated task force in late August. Currently, we are thoroughly reviewing all documentation affecting restructure proposals. We are going back to the field to request your help in ensuring we have accurately captured all the critical tasks of CMF 98 MOS, because of the many changes in organization, equipment, and mission of the past couple of years. Our priorities are —

- ☐ Review all restructure data and request additional field input where necessary.
- ☐ Ensure a valid, executable transitional training plan exists for each MOS prior to a merger. We must train our NCOs as well as our AIT soldiers.
- ☐ Ensure any merger is in the best interests of the MI Corps and the Army.

For more information, call either CW3 Hammond (DSN 821-6301, Commercial (602)533-6301) or MSG Sames (DSN 821-1179/1182, Commercial (602)533-1179/1182).

Warrant Officer Notes

DA Pamphlet 600-11, Warrant Officer Professional Development, is being revised and the MI portion has been substantially changed The primary changes include revised descriptions of functions, professional development, objectives, and civilian education programs for which officers may apply IAW **AR 621-1, Training of Military Personnel at Civilian Institutions.**

All civilian education programs will be MOS-related with a look to the future. The entire focus of this change is to bring **DA Pamphlet 600-11** in line with the Warrant Officer Leader Development Action Plan (WOLDAP). Along with changes to **AR 611-112, Personnel Selection and Classification: Manual of Warrant Officer Military Occupational Specialties,** these changes will give warrant officers, their commanders, and their assignment manager the regulatory guidance to plan and execute a successful and rewarding career.

In other warrant officer issues, we are still looking for qualified applicants for the Warrant Officer Program. Particularly short are MOSs 351B and 351E. Applicants for any of these MOSs must be sergeant (E5). Applicants must include a Statement of Personal History (DD Form 398) with their application. Soldiers married to foreign nationals are not eligible to apply until the spouse becomes a U.S. citizen. Other prerequisites for MI warrant officer applicants follow.

For **MOS 350B, All-Source Intelligence Technician**, applicants must have—

- ☐ At least two assignments which include a minimum of four years of operational experience as a working Intelligence Analyst (MOS 96B).
- ☐ Completed Intelligence Analyst Course 243-96B10.
- ☐ Graduated from BNCOC.
- ☐ A current special background investigation (SBI) and be eligible for SCI access prior to admission to WOCS.

For **MOS 350D, Imagery Intelligence Technician**, applicants must have—

- ☐ At least two assignments which include a minimum of four years' operational experience as an Imagery Analyst (MOS 96D).
- ☐ Completed Imagery Analyst Course 242-96D10.
- ☐ Graduated from BNCOC.
- ☐ A current SBI prior to admission to WOCS.

For **MOS 350L, Attache Technician**, applicants must—

- ☐ Hold MOS 71L with an ASI of E4.
- ☐ Be a BNCOC graduate.
- ☐ Have at least two assignments which include a minimum of four years' operational experience in the Defense Attache System (DAS).
- ☐ Apply within two years of completion of the last DAS assignment.
- ☐ Have completed the Attache Staff Operations Course 3A-FB/243-F2 at the Defense Intelligence College, Washington, D.C.
- ☐ Have an SBI within the last five years and be eligible for SCI access prior to admission to WOCS.

Send applications through Commander, USAFSC (Army Attache Management Division), ATTN: IASV-P-A, Fort Meade, MD 20755-5905, DSN 923-2134, ext 2631 or Commercial (410) 677-2134, ext 2631. (AC only.)

For **MOS 351B, Counterintelligence Technician**, applicants must have—

- ☐ At least two assignments which include a minimum of four years' operational experience as a CI Agent (MOS 97B).
- ☐ Completed the T.C.I. Agent Course 244-97B20.
- ☐ Graduated from BNCOC.
- ☐ An SBI within the last five years and be eligible for SCI access prior to admission to WOCS.

If the applicant is a polygraph institute graduate (ASI P8), he or she must have at least 18 months of operational experience as a polygrapher.

For **MOS 351C, Area Intelligence Technician**, refer to **AR 614-115, Military Intelligence Officer Excepted Career Program**, for prerequisites.

For **MOS 351E, Interrogation Technician**, applicants must have—

- ☐ At least two assignments which include a minimum of four years' operational experience as an Interrogator (MOS 97E).
- ☐ Completed Interrogator Course 241-97E10.
- ☐ Graduated from BNCOC.
- ☐ A Defense Language Proficiency Test (DLPT) III rating of R2/S2/L2 in one foreign language as verified by a current DA Form 330, and be a qualified linguist. This form must accompany the application.
- ☐ A DLAB score of 89 or above.

For **MOS 352C, Traffic Analysis Technician**, applicants must have—

- ☐ At least two assignments which include a minimum of four years' operational experience as a Signals Intelligence Analyst (MOS 98C).
- ☐ Completed the EW/SIGINT Analyst Course X3ABR20230A.
- ☐ Graduated from BNCOC.
- ☐ An SBI within the past five years and be eligible for SCI access prior to admission to WOCS.

For **MOS 352D, Emitter Location/Identification Technician**, applicants must have—

- ☐ At least two assignments which include a minimum of four years' operational experience as an Emitter Locator/Identifier (MOS 98D).
- ☐ Completed EW/SIGINT Emitter Locator/Identifier Course 231-98D.
- ☐ Graduated from BNCOC.
- ☐ An SBI within the past five years and be eligible for SCI access prior to admission to WOCS.

For **MOS 352G, Voice Intercept Technician**, applicants must have—

- ☐ At least two assignments which include a minimum of four years' operational experience in MOS 98G.
- ☐ Graduated from BNCOC.
- ☐ Completed EW/SIGINT Voice Interceptor Course X3AZK085ZZ.
- ☐ Qualified in a least one foreign language with a DLPT III score of R2/L2 verified on a current DA Form 330. The test must be no more than a year old. Include a copy of the test with your application.
- ☐ A DLAB score of 89 or above.
- ☐ An SBI within the past five years and be eligible for SCI access prior to admission to WOCS.

For **352H, Morse Intercept Technician**, applicants must have—

- ☐ At least two assignments which include a mini-

mum of four years' operational experience as a Morse Interceptor (MOS 98H).

☐ Completed EW/SIGINT Morse Collection Course 231-98H.
☐ Graduated from BNCOC.
☐ An SBI within the past five years and be eligible for SCI access prior to admission to WOCS.

For **MOS 352J, Emanations Analysis Technician**, applicants must have—

☐ At least two assignments with four years' operational experience as a Noncommunications Interceptor/Analyst (MOS 98J).
☐ Graduated from BNCOC.
☐ An SBI within the past five years and be eligible for SCI access prior to admission to WOCS.

For **MOS 352K, Non-Morse Intercept Technician**, applicants must have—

☐ At least two assignments which include a minimum of four years' operational experience as a Non-Morse Interceptor/Analyst (MOS 98K).
☐ Completed Cryptologic Technician Course A-231-0045-0044.
☐ An SBI within the past five years and be eligible for SCI access before admission to WOCS.

For **MOS 353A, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Equipment Technician**, applicants must have—

☐ At least two assignments which include a minimum of four years' operational experience in

any MOS within CMF 33.

☐ Completed EW/Intercept Systems Repairer Course 102-33S10.
☐ Graduated from BNCOC.
☐ An SBI within the past five years and be eligible for SCI access prior to admission to WOCS.

Language Notes

AR 220-1, Unit Status Report. AR 220-1, dated July 31, 1993, requires that the commander consider current DLPT scores when assessing unit readiness. Significantly, **AR 220-1** now requires the commander to list the lack of language proficiency as a reason for a less than "C-1" unit readiness rating. This affects units that have authorizations with MOSs 97BL, 97E, 98CL, 98G, 37F, their warrant officer equivalents, Foreign Area Officers (FA 48), or PSYOP/Civil Affairs Officers (FA 39).

These soldiers must have a minimum DLPT score of "2" in listening and reading. The **AR 220-1** change emphasizes the importance of establishing and maintaining viable Command Language Programs to improve unit readiness.

Arabic Shortages. We are continually short of MOS 98G in Arabic—all dialects. MOS 97E is short in the Arabic-Gulf dialect. On the other hand, MOSs 98G and 97E German, Russian, Czech, and Polish languages are now surplus. We urge you to apply for retraining in Arabic-Egyptian, Arabic-Syrian, or Arabic-Gulf for MOS 98G and for Arabic-Gulf for MOS 97E, Interrogator, if you qualify.

Release of TRADOC's FM 100-5 Educational Package

The package consists of three elements:
☐ A CD-ROM computer disk.
☐ A 35mm slide presentation with recommended script.
☐ A VHS video tape.

The **CD-ROM disk** has both the 1986 and the 1993 versions of FM 100-5, Operations; FM 100-1, The Army; The National Security Strategy of the U.S.; and the U.S National Military Strategy. The programs on the disk include three audio-visual animations which explain—

☐ Battle space.
☐ The dynamics between operational offense and defense, as illustrated in the Yom Kippur War.
☐ The concept of simultaneous attack in depth, as represented in Operation Just Cause.

Explanatory teaching points accompany each

animation. The disk allows the user to perform a variety of research and word processing functions such as word search and split screen comparison.

The **35mm slide presentation and script** explain the new **FM 100-5** in terms of its new concepts, lines of thrust, and the strategic context in which it was developed.

The **VHS video** gives the viewer historical insight into the production of our keystone doctrine and its relevance to our Army as a strategic force for the 21st century.

Initial distribution is 1,200 copies of the CD-ROM disk and 650 copies of the VHS tape and slide presentation to the Active and Reserve Components.

Point of contact is Lieutenant Colonel Pat Ritter (DSN 552-2138) in the School of Advanced Military Studies.

TRAINING NOTES

DTIMS Tactics Division Bulletin Board Service

by Captain Erasmo A. Martinez and
Captain Phillip L. Kesler

In the spirit of the MI concept, the Tactics Division of the Directorate of Tactics, Intelligence, and Military Science (DTIMS) has instituted an electronic Bulletin Board Service (BBS). The purpose is to exchange information and to share our instructors' expertise.

The Tactics Division teaches tactical intelligence to officer basic, transition, and advanced course students. Tactics Division soldiers teach other courses as well, and are the subject matter experts on the command estimate process and tactical intelligence operations at corps and below.

The idea of operating a BBS started a year ago, when the Combined Arms Branch, now the Tactics Division, started the CAB-BBS. It operated during non-duty hours and weekends only. Now the Tactics Division BBS (TDBBS) operates 24 hours a day with new software and updated information.

The TDBBS provides users in Army units worldwide a professional forum to extract information directly from the Intelligence Center, and at the same time, to share ideas with our instructors. We welcome your suggestions and ideas. If approved, they are often integrated into our instruction so that we can provide units in the field—our real con-sumers—the best trained intelligence officers possible. The TDBBS also serves as an electronic mail service, where you can post messages to other users.

Currently, much of the Bulletin Board consists of our instruction files. Already on-line are—

☐ Lesson plans and slides.
☐ Training scenarios.
☐ The latest publications such as **FM 34-8, Combat Commander's Handbook on Intelligence, FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield,** and **FM 100-5, Operations.**

Our goal is to expand the TDBBS to provide a variety of information services to the intelligence community, including military-related public domain software similar to the kind C²MUG provides. All our files are compressed using a program called PKZIP Version 110. This program is Shareware, and can be downloaded from the TDBBS.

We are operating on a 386 MS-DOS-compatible computer, running Renegade BBS software. Future plans include installing a CD-ROM for extra file capacity and a faster modem.

To access the TDBBS, you need—
☐ A computer with a modem.
☐ Some kind of communication software capable of ANSI-BBS terminal emulation (Pro-Comm works just fine).
☐ A DSN or commercial telephone line.

We operate 24 hours a day, 7 days a week on DSN 821-1992 or Commercial (602)533-1992, modem settings N-8-1, 2400 baud, ANSI-BBS ter-minal emulation.

Once you place the call, the system will prompt you to type your name or type "NEW" for new users. The BBS is menu-driven, and the choices are self-explanatory. There is also on-line assistance to help you "navigate" through the system.

System operators (SysOps) are Captain Erasmo A. Martinez and Captain Phillip L. Kesler, both in-structors at Tactics Division. They can be reached at DSN 821-3274 or Commercial (602) 533-3274, Mon-day through Friday from 0830 to 1730 (Mountain Time) for assistance, or you can leave a message on the BBS.

Once you are on-line, there are rules to follow. TDBBS callers must behave professionally and use appropriate language while on-line. Users can download and upload as many files as their time on-line permits, and may call up to five times a day.

Users may not upload or share commercial software in the TDBBS, nor should they use profanity or share profane or pornographic material through the BBS. The SysOps reserve the right to "lock out" any users who do not follow these rules of etiquette. We also review all uploaded files for con-tent, and check them for viruses.

The TDBBS is a great way to communicate and share information.

**The Commander Drives Intelligence!
Only the Best Train the Rest!**

CPT Erasmo A. Martinez is an ROTC graduate of the University of Puerto Rico. He is an instructor/writer at Tactics Division.

CPT Phillip L. Kesler is an ROTC graduate of George Mason University in Virginia. He is an instructor/writer at Tactics Division.

PROFESSIONAL READING

Soldat: Reflections of a German Soldier, 1936-1949 by Siegfried Knappe and Ted Brusaw (Durango, CO: Orion Books, 1992) 384 pages, $23.

Siegfried Knappe served in the German army before and during World War II. A highly decorated veteran of numerous engagements, Knappe draws on his recollections and war diaries to create a compelling personal account of those nightmare years. As an artillery officer, Knappe's service spanned the spectrum of German military operations: from the initial conquest of the Sudetenland in 1936 to the final days of the Third Reich in 1945. In between these two events, Knappe served in almost every major front in the European theatre, France, Russia, Poland, and Italy.

Knappe presents a first-hand look at the war from the German perspective. What makes this book so eminently readable and enjoyable is Knappe's own personal growth during the war years. Knappe began his military career as an idealistic, young officer who proudly marched into the Sudetenland to avenge Germany's honor after her stunning defeat at the Versailles peace table. He gradually begins to question his government and its cause. By 1945, Knappe, now a major, is sickened by the war and what it has brought upon Germany. He finds himself face-to-face in the Führer-bunker with Adolph Hitler during the final days of the battle of Berlin. For several seconds, Knappe seriously entertains the idea of shooting Hitler and ending the madness he witnesses around him.

After the Reich falls, Knappe is captured by the Russians and spends five years as a prisoner in various detention camps in the Soviet Union. During this time, he comes to accept the reality of Nazi Germany's aggression and crimes against the world.

This work triumphs in its portrait of a good man who tries to do his duty and serve his country while maintaining his own personal code of honor. Those who read **Soldat** will encounter a deeply personal and historically expansive work which sheds new light into the Second World War as seen through the eyes of a brave, honorable soldier who happened to be the enemy.

MAJ Jack Thomas Tomarchio
Philadelphia, PA

The First Information War by Alan D. Campen (Fairfax, VA: AFCEA International Press, 1992) 195 pages, $19.

Strategic-tactical communications support to military operations always seems to be taken for granted until a crisis arises. Military communications are usually not fully appreciated by the end user. People don't understand what is involved until communications are not available to support the mission. This is true whether one commands a company or a joint task force. To "train as we fight" also seems more applicable to combat arms than to our military communicators.

The Gulf War appears to have brought this point to bear. U.S. Armed Forces were ill-prepared for the magnitude of communications needed not only for American Forces in Desert Shield and Desert Storm, but also for the connectivity to coalition forces. More to the point, there was no "comprehensive joint architecture" to support such an effort.

The U.S. Army Chief of Staff has called Desert Storm/Desert Shield the "knowledge war." However, little recognition of this fact is apparent in after-action reports. They describe how this "knowledge war" was supported by the many complex communications and information systems required to ensure the notable success. The editor quotes a Pentagon observer as saying after-action reports "fail to convey the enormity of the communications task and the competence with which it was fulfilled," and, "much that they accomplished from August to February had not even been dreamed of in July."

As contributing editor, retired Air Force Colonel Alan D. Campen has done a great service to the entire military and industrial community with this compilation of essays (some previously published). The essays address critical communications support during Desert Storm and how it was emplaced and successfully used. He calls it The First Information War.

The authors of the essays are notable and most will be familiar to members of the intelligence community. Represented are national agencies, Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and industry; the writers include people directly involved in Desert Storm, those who provided supervision and support, and knowledgeable observers.

Further, Campen expresses valid concern that collectively, as a C^41 community, we will forget the important lessons learned in preparing for and prosecuting the communications and information support in the Gulf. Campen brings some admitted biases and beliefs as contributing editor: Desert Storm was a significantly different war; the key role of information systems will soon be forgotten; the quickly established assets will be disbanded because key decision makers will not understand why these assets were key to the Gulf War victory; and if we as a community understand its importance, the proper conduct of an information war will allow the U.S. military to have a smaller force structure and still accomplish its mission of supporting the nation's goals and objectives.

Most of us can identify with these biases, and Campen places them in a meaningful context. His book offers insight into the complexities and the extreme difficulties of "using information both as a weapon and as a target in the Persian Gulf War"—information systems and information denial.

There is a lot of information in this relatively small book. The insights and details from individuals involved are invaluable for the future and should be a "must read" for all of us in the C^41 com-

The First Information War is a well-edited addition to the libraries of today's intelligence professionals The authors are well chosen as subject matter experts. Together with the references and footnotes, the essays provide a foundation and detailed knowledge of a key aspect of warfighting. This capability is needed to ensure U.S. Army Forces are prepared for the next "mission," be it the drug war, intervention in the Balkans, or another Desert Storm.

While there are classified documents addressing many of the book's subjects, Campen's effort places them in perspective. He brings needed attention to the requirement for a coherent communications and information systems architecture for the services and nation-al agencies. Such an architecture will ensure a future capability to wage a successful information war. While today's catch word in the Pentagon is "joint-ness," there is much to be done to make this a reality. It is encouraging to see an effort that brings it all together as well as this book does.

larry T. Newman
rlington, VA

Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin America by Timothy P. Wickham (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992) 424 pages, $54.

Wickham's book is the result of the most scientifically rigorous study on guerrilla wars in Latin America during the Cold War era. Author Timothy Wickham-Crowley is a sociology professor and Associate Director, Center for Latin American Studies, Georgetown University. He uses five variables to examine six guerrilla conflicts from 1956 to 1970. He then applies the refined methodology to 28 more guerrilla struggles which took place from 1970 until the late 1980's.

Professor Wickham-Crowley's six study-models are guerrilla conflicts active in Cuba, Venezuela, Guatemala, Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia. He scrupulously investigated these five variables: (1) Was a guerrilla organization genuinely established during the conflict? (2) How extensive was the support for that movement among peasants and workers? (3) What were the comparative strengths of the armed guerrilla units and the nation's armed forces? (4) To what extent did the U.S. give military support to the government? (5) Was there a government of the patrimonial/ praetorian type which the author calls a "Mafiacracy"?

The author arrives at some surprising conclusion from the first part of his study. Peasant and worker support did not automatically materialize in some cases, and in others, when support did materialize, it was not the determining factor in the outcome. More government troops and weapons, and the existence of U.S. military assistance, were not necessarily determining factors either. The two variables which were important in determining factors were the first and last.

Using the Boolean system of logic for reducing common sets of variables, Wickham-Crowley then applies his paradigm to 28 more cases where significant guerrilla activity was at least reported extensively. His results again validate statistically, resulting in a scientifically neutral, objective way to explain the triumph of revolutionary guerrilla forces in Cuba in 1959; the triumph of comparable forces in Nicaragua in 1977; and the failure of all the other guerrilla forces in the Latin American region to overthrow their national governments.

Wichkam-Crowley's extremely well-written book, when combined with Vladimir Tismaneanu's and Michale Randu's classic book, **Latin American Revolutionaries: Groups, Goals, Methods**, produces a full, scholarly analysis on the Latin American guerrilla warfare syndrome for the student of history and revolutionary warfare. The Wickham-Crowley volume fills the same void for Latin American guerrilla conflicts that Crane Brinton's **Anatomy of a Revolution** filled for the study of national revolutions. These works are scientific inquiries on a subject where intellectualized emotionalism has too often been accepted as academic writing.

For the specialized student of Latin American politics and conflict, two earlier volumes retain value in the wake of Professor Wickham-Crowley's cardinal study. These are editor Georges Fauriol's **Latin American Insurgencies**, and Luis Mercier Vega's **Guerrillas in Latin America**. Other genre literature now descends to the realm of outdated polemics against U.S. foreign policy, books whose scholarly objectivity should have been questioned when they were first published. Some of these are Richard Gott's **Guerrilla Movements in Latin America**, Irving Louis Horowitz, Josue de Castro, and John Gerassi, editors, **Latin American Radicalism: A Documentary Report on Left and Nationalist Movements**, John Gerassi's **The Great Fear In Latin America**, and editors James Petras and Maurice Zeitlin's **Latin America: Reform or Revolution?**

The Wickham-Crowley volume is both the classic in its field and the best methodological work yet seen on the analysis of guerrilla conflict.

Russell W. Ramsey, Ph.D.
Fort Benning, GA

The British Military Dilemma in Ireland by Elizabeth A. Muenger (Lawrence, KS: The University Press of Kansas, 1991), 254 pages, $30.

Unfortunately, this book offers no solution to the "Irish Problem," as it was either a hundred years ago or as it is today. Instead, Elizabeth Muenger selects from the history of the British Empire, perhaps its most critical 28-year period, and examines its impact on the political and sociological enigma that was Ireland.

Muenger begins by reminding us of the scope of British rule: "The most successful "Empire" in the world...covering 25 percent of the globe." She then focuses on England's stormy relationship with Ireland, and its frequently mutinous population. A population which continuously raised the question of loyalty to London, particularly during the Napoleonic wars and the days preceding World War I. She then factors in the impact of the Industrial Revolution, Land Reform, and dramatic changes forced on the British army between the Crimean War, the Boer War, and World War I.

The author dismisses the notion of the simple "Orange" vs. "Green" conflict one usually associates with the "dilemma" in Ireland. Instead, she offers an exceptional look into the components that make up the problem. She artfully weaves the players into a Celtic Knot that reflects both her ability as an historian and her craftsmanship as a writer.

In so doing, Ms. Muenger details the "Four Irelands:" "The Dublin Castle Ireland" which governed and whose head was appointed by London; "Military Ireland," an army force of as many as 30,000 soldiers, quartered in Ireland for almost 150 years with nothing but the vaguest mission; "Protestant Ireland," the frequently absentee Anglo-Irish who controlled most of the wealth and power; and "Catholic Ireland," the Irish majority who generally wanted land reform and the British out. With a touch the Irish would appreciate, she then further complicates the mix by adding elements, such as well-to-do Catholic landowners, who bled across parochial lines.

To the military reader, the gem of The British Military Dilemma in Ireland is Muenger's description of the 19th century British Army in Ireland. She describes officers who, with generally little to do, isolated themselves by their socialization with "Protestant Ireland" while ignoring "Catholic Ireland." She illustrates the mutual lack of confidence between the army and the Dublin government with such examples as the resentment of troops called upon to perform policy duties alongside police forces who in turn resented the army's involvement. This is perhaps a classic example of how not to use armies to suppress insurrection.

The book's 26 pages of footnotes and 10-plus pages of bibliography leave little doubt that this is a scholarly work. Muenger avoids the ponderous literary style usually associated with such a study. I was impressed with the depth of Ms. Muenger knowledge and the impartiality with which she addresses all sides of the "Irish Problem." No less impressive is the artful manner in which the author presents her material.

If I were to presume criticism of a work I unabashedly enjoyed, it would come in the form of a common fault among historians. There is the tendency to make reference to incidents well known to them, but virtually unknown to less-informed readers. Read the book; but first jump ahead to page 87 and read about the Phoenix Park Murders, page 155 for the Bachelor's Walk Incident, and Chapter 5 for the Curragh Incident. You'll feel smarter and the flow of the book will be uninterrupted.

MW4 Richard Cameron
Sierra Vista, AZ

Spies and Provocateurs: A Worldwide Encyclopedia of Persons Conducting Espionage and Covert Actions by Wendell L. Minnick (Jefferson, NC. McFarland & Company, Inc, 1992) 310 pages, $45.

The intelligence community now has an invaluable reference resource on post-World War II espionage and covert action. This should not be thought of as the definitive, exhaustive reference of espionage and covert action, but rather as a quick reference guide for research. The author provides a synopsis of over 700 agents as well as a bit of insight into their activities. The book does a good job of covering the majority of Western intelligence personalities; however it falls short when dealing with their Eastern counterparts. This is due to the lack of openness and freedom of press inherent in Communist regimes.

I was pleased to discover the large amount of data the author has collected on Third World agents Few, if any, comparable works deal with Third World agents adequately, and only this one allows the reader to quick-reference these agents. Most books dealing with intelligence and covert action neglect the importance of intelligence activities in the Third World. The reality is that most intelligence activities have taken place in the Third World on the periphery of the bipolar struggle. This book provides an extensive bibliography. Minnick also provides a chronology which delineates milestones of espionage and covert action.

In a few places, the book is sparse on information, and some of the individuals listed escape with only a few sentences on their activities. Additionally, the author sometimes overwhelms the reader with information which detracts from the book's consistency and quick-reference format.

Minnick provides an outstanding starting point for research on individuals conducting espionage and covert action. The book gives an overview of the history of intelligence activities in the post-World War II era, which is invaluable to both the casual and professional reader. Without an understanding of the

history of intelligence activities and the participants involved, we cannot assess past experiences and we cannot understand present limitations. I recommend this book because it gives the reader not only an understanding of the events in the Cold War era, but also provides an explanation of the underlying motivations that defined the era.

SGT Eliot A. Jardines
Fairfield, CT

The Comandante Speaks: Memoirs of an El Salvadoran Guerrilla Leader by Courtney E. Prisk, editor (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991) 145 pages, $25.

During the early-to-mid-1980's, along with Nicaragua, El Salvador was the showcase of anticommunist resolve and policy of the Reagan Administration. Then, and probably still today, the Salvadoran conflict remains an amalgamation of political rhetoric-filled contradictions, exaggerations, and misperceptions. How does one sort out the truth? The words of former U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador, Edwin G. Corr, quoted at the beginning and taken from the book's preface, best summarize this review.

Of the many books, newspapers, and magazine articles that through the years have attempted to capture the reality of the war in El Salvador, this book comes the closest to putting the entire conflict into proper perspective Liberals and conservatives, alike, will find some gratification in knowing that at some point during the conflict they were probably right. This is what made reality in El Salvador so difficult to define as conditions and an unstable situation changed from year to year. An example serves to clarify this point. During the 1980-1983 period, reporting on El Salvador focused on Salvadoran government repression and extensive human rights violations: the murder of American nuns, the assassination of U.S. aid employees, and numerous death squad-related murders. These events reflected the nature of a society in the midst of massive socio-political turmoil and upheaval. For a fleeting moment in time, this, in fact, was El Salvador's historical reality.

That was then and this is now. The politically astute critic must now recognize the changes in El Salvador, culminating with the pivotal year of 1992. That is when the peace accords between the Salvadoran government and the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) took effect. This ultimately led to the "demobilization" of the FMLN on December 15, 1992.

The Comandante Speaks is a first person account resulting from interviews with a former FMLN guerrilla leader. In addition to the insightful analysis of the inner workings of the insurgent political and military organization, the most effective aspect of his portrayals is the framework in which the information is presented. The interviews correspond to the six major changes that occurred in the FMLN's organization and structure: 1968-1979—The Period of Organization; 1979-1981—The Period of Disarray; 1981-1984—Insurgent Ascendant; 1984-1987—New

Strategies as the War Changed Direction; and 1987-1989—Stalemate. Unfortunately, because of the Comandante's death at the hands of FMLN assassins, the book leaves a gap between 1989 and 1992—what history may ultimately label as the "Final Chapter." This, of course, assumes that El Salvador makes a peaceful transition of power during the 1994 presidential elections, without renewed FMLN aggression

Another important contribution is the assessment of the impact that external support had on the insurgency. The accounts of the tremendous influence that Nicaragua and Cuba had on the insurgent command is also insightful, in light of widespread international criticism of U.S. Government claims that El Salvador was an externally supported insurgency.

This is not a perfect book; the reader will find many typographical errors resulting from literal translations from Spanish language interviews. Do not, however, allow these to prejudice you against this book. It belongs on the bookshelf of every military professional who is intrigued by the vicissitudes of modern insurgencies in general and the complexities of the Salvadoran insurgency in particular.

LTC Victor M. Rosello
Fort Bragg, NC

Arab Military Industry: Capability, Performance, and Impact by Yezid Sayigh (McLean, VA: Brassey's, U.S , 1992) 271 pages, $50.

As the Cold War was ending, many observers questioned the role of the international defense industry in this new era. Among their concerns, what would happen to client-states of the superpowers, in particular countries of the Middle East. **Arab Military Industry** answers these questions.

The military industry in Arab countries is a developing phenomenon. The three main arguments of Mr. Sayigh's book are: (1) National Security issues drive the development of military industry, (2) Arab countries are hindered by their lack of research and development capabilities; and (3) the Arab defense industry is seriously hampered by the lack of parallel development in the civilian arena.

Originally written in Arabic, this translation leaves out chapters on Israeli industry and comparisons to other Third World military industries. Good discussions of the industries in Egypt, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia are contained in this book. The chapter on Iraq makes interesting reading, particularly in light of the 1991 Gulf War.

As an introduction to the military industry in the region, this book is probably as accurate as you can get from unclassified sources. There is much factual, quantitative information that can give the forward-looking MI professional a good idea of what is going on in the region today, and what to expect in the future. If you are serious about studying the Middle East, **Arab Military Industry** should be on your reading list.

1LT Paolo Profumo
New Orleans, LA

313th
MI Battalion
(Airborne)

The 313th MI Battalion unit crest consists of the coat of arms in the traditional Branch colors of oriental blue and white. The checkered field of orange and silver symbolizes the battalion's former affiliation with the Signal Corps. The six points of the mallet (star) allude to its decorations for World War II and the Vietnam War. Attached just below the shield is a silver scroll which is inscribed with the 313th MI Battalion motto — "SAVOIR C'EST POUVOIR" — KNOWLEDGE IS POWER.

The Snow Owl is symbolic of the battalion's primary mission: performing intelligence collection so that the 82d Airborne Division can "see" the battlefield, so that it can conduct electronic warfare as a combat multiplier, to fight and win. The owl has all the attributes important to an airborne MI battalion. It is one of the few birds that fly all day or night, in all kinds of weather. The owl is a stalker, a silent predator. It has an acute sense of hearing and sight, and is territorial. The Snow Owl Battalion is always out front, flying in support of the 82d Airborne Division.

Headquartered at Fort Bragg, NC, the 313th MI Battalion (ABN) provides intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) support to the Army's only airborne division, the 82d Airborne Division. The 82d is the only division capable of going "wheels up" within 18 hours, to deploy anywhere in the world to conduct a combat parachute operation. As such, the 82d is called upon to respond to various worldwide contingencies.

The 313th MI Battalion traces its heritage from May 11, 1942, when the 215th Signal Depot Company was constituted. The company was activated on September 25, 1942, at Camp Livingston, LA. On April 21, 1955, the company was redesignated as Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC), 313th Communications Reconnaissance Battalion and assigned to the Regular Army.

Alpha and Bravo Companies were activated at Fort Bragg after being reorganized out of the 358th and 337th Communications Reconnaissance Companies. The battalion was then redesignated as the 313th Army Security Agency Battalion on July 1, 1956. On October 16, 1979, the 313th MI Battalion was formed from the HHC, 313th ASA Battalion, the 358th ASA Company, and the 82d MI Company and was assigned to the 82d Airborne Division. The unit fought in 5 campaigns in World War II, 12 campaigns in the Vietnam War, and in Grenada. The unit was awarded the Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army) for action in France in 1944 and for action in Vietnam from 1966 to 1971. In addition, the unit received the French Croix de Guerre with Palm during World War II for the Normandy Beach campaign, and the Republic of Vietnam Cross of Gallantry with Palm during action from 1970 to 1971.

The 313th continues to meet all challenges. In December 1989, Alpha Company, with attachments, conducted a combat parachute operation into Panama. In August 1990, the battalion deployed to Southwest Asia for Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. In September 1992, Bravo Company, with attachments, deployed to Southern Florida as part of the Humanitarian Relief effort to aid the victims of Hurricane Andrew. Currently, the battalion is fielding the ASAS, restructuring our MTOE, and taking the lead as the Army's premier tactical MI Battalion. **ALL THE WAY! AIRBORNE!**